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BANKRUPTCY ON THE SIDE
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ABSTRACT—This Article provides a framework for analyzing side
agreements among stakeholders in corporate bankruptcy, such as
intercreditor and “bad boy” agreements. These agreements are
controversial because they commonly include a promise by a stakeholder to
remain silent—to waive some procedural right they would otherwise have
under the Bankruptcy Code—at potentially crucial points in the
reorganization process.
Using simplified examples, we show that side agreements create
benefits in some instances. But, in other cases, parties to a side agreement
may attempt to extract value from nonparties to the agreement by
contracting for specific performance or excessive stipulated damages that
impose negative externalities on those nonparties. By using more extreme
(and inefficient) remedies, the parties to the agreement can commit
themselves to charging more to nonparties who—seeking to avoid the
externalities—pay them to breach the agreement. While this can be
profitable for the parties to the agreement, it can also lower the collective
value of the estate for all stakeholders.
We develop a proposal that not only preserves the efficiency benefits
of side agreements but also limits negative externalities and opportunities
to extract value from nonparties. Where a nontrivial potential for valuedestroying externalities exists, the court should enforce the agreements but
limit the remedies for breach to expectation damages. Our proposal is
superior to the current approach in the case law, which focuses on tougher
contract interpretation standards instead of limitations on remedies.
We also use our model to determine whether intercreditor agreement
disputes should be resolved by the bankruptcy court or by other courts. If
the nonbreaching party asks for expectation damages, the bankruptcy court
has no particular expertise and should defer to forum selection clauses.
Where the nonbreaching party seeks specific performance or stipulated
damages, by contrast, our model suggests that the dispute should be
resolved exclusively in bankruptcy proceedings.
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INTRODUCTION
The Bankruptcy Code was designed to resolve coordination problems
that arise when multiple creditors hold claims against a common debtor.1 In
broad terms, the Bankruptcy Code tries to strike a balance between
respecting the individual rights held by creditors and limiting the negative
impact of the exercise of those rights on the value of the company’s assets
as a whole. 2 Bankruptcy adds the most value when creditors and other
stakeholders are dispersed and uncoordinated, making bargaining outside
bankruptcy costly or impossible. To encourage coordination toward
reaching a value-maximizing outcome in those cases, the law suspends
creditors’ individual collection efforts and creates a structured bargaining
process. 3
Resolving coordination problems while respecting individual rights is
a challenging task, even in garden-variety cases. But recent developments
in the financing structure of firms have added additional layers of
complexity to the problem. In a spate of recent cases, bankruptcy judges
have been asked to resolve disputes regarding side agreements between two
or more stakeholders who form a subset of the overall stakeholder body. 4 A
common example of such a side agreement is an intercreditor agreement,
whereby two creditor groups, and sometimes the debtor, agree on how to
allocate cash flow and control rights between the parties to the agreement
when a bankruptcy occurs. 5 Outcomes in large corporate reorganization
cases—not only the division of value but also what happens to the
company itself—can turn on the judge’s interpretation and enforcement of
such a side agreement as well as on the secondary and tertiary deals
arranged by one or more of the parties to work around that original side
agreement. Disputes about the side agreement or the subsequent
1

Even over a century ago, lawmakers recognized that if creditors were left to their state law
collection remedies, they might “race to the courthouse,” potentially destroying the going concern value
of an otherwise viable firm. Bankruptcy’s role in solving this coordination problem is the focus of the
principal normative theory of bankruptcy, the “creditors’ bargain” model. See THOMAS H. JACKSON,
THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 10–11 (1986).
2
For example, although secured creditors are not permitted to foreclose on their collateral (because
the collateral may be needed for a reorganization or other resolution of the debtor’s financial distress),
the Bankruptcy Code does require “adequate protection” of secured creditors’ interests. 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(d)(1) (2012).
3
See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2012) (imposing a stay on collection activities).
4
See, for example, the cases discussed infra Part V.
5
For a practitioner-oriented discussion of intercreditor agreements and the issues they raise in
bankruptcy, see Jeffrey A. Marks, Bankruptcy Issues in Intercreditor Agreements, SQUIRE PATTON
BOGGS (May 31, 2009), http://www.squirepattonboggs.com/~/media/files/insights/publications/
2009/05/bankruptcy-issues-in-intercreditor-agreements/files/intercreditor_agreements_2009/
fileattachment/intercreditor_agreements_2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/A8N9-5UW2].
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workaround arrangements—which we will call “defections”—have become
one of the most important controversies in an increasing number of recent
cases. 6
A common theme in these disputes is the allegation that one of the
parties to the side agreement breached a promise to be “silent” in some
way, by asserting a right or taking an action that would otherwise be
permissible under the Bankruptcy Code, but is prohibited by the agreement.
Often, the dispute involves allegations by one of the parties to the side
agreement (the promisee) that the other party (the promisor) has struck a
new deal with another stakeholder to defect from the side agreement.
Because the promisee alleges that this defection breaches the side
agreement, the promisee then seeks to enjoin the defection. Thus, while the
parties purportedly write these agreements to encourage coordination and
limit unnecessary litigation, they are often invoked to shut down new
coordination efforts.
The recent Momentive case provides an example of the kinds of side
agreements and defections that can arise.7 Momentive Performance
Materials (Momentive), a silicone and quartz manufacturer that had been
acquired by a private equity fund in 2006, entered bankruptcy with a capital
structure that included first- and second-lien secured debt, and other
categories of unsecured debt. 8 Prior to bankruptcy, the first- and secondlien creditors signed an intercreditor agreement that restricted the ability of
the second-lien note creditors to enforce certain rights that would have been
available to them as secured creditors.9 After Momentive filed for
bankruptcy, the second-lien creditors reached a deal to defect with the
debtors (called a restructuring support agreement) that would reorganize
the company and give the stock of the reorganized Momentive to the

6

See, e.g., In re Musicland Holding Corp., 386 B.R. 428, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding that the
unambiguous language of the intercreditor agreement must be followed despite the subordinated
creditors having a different understanding of its terms), aff’d, 318 F. App’x 36 (2d Cir. 2009); In re TCI
2 Holdings, LLC, 428 B.R. 117, 141 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2010) (holding, in a case involving competing
plans of reorganization, that the court did not need to determine whether the second lien holders’ plan
violated the side agreement because, even with a violation, confirmation would not be impeded); In re
Hart Ski Mfg. Co., 5 B.R. 734, 736 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1980) (early case addressing the enforceability of
intercreditor agreements under Bankruptcy Code § 510(a), holding that there is no indication that
Congress intended to allow creditors to alter, through subordination agreements, bankruptcy provisions
unrelated to asset distribution).
7
See In re MPM Silicones, LLC, 518 B.R. 740 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014). We discuss the Momentive
controversy in detail in Parts II.B and IV, infra.
8
In re MPM Silicones, LLC, 531 B.R. 321, 324–25 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), aff’d in part, rev'd in part,
No. 15-1682, 2017 WL 4772248 (2d Cir. Oct. 20, 2017).
9
MPM Silicones, 518 B.R. at 751.

258

112:255 (2017)

Bankruptcy on the Side

second-lien creditors. 10 The second-lien creditors also supported actions the
debtor took and arguments the debtor made to reduce the value that the
first-lien creditors would receive. 11 The first-lien creditors sued the secondlien creditors in state court for violating the intercreditor agreement, but the
litigation was removed to the bankruptcy court and decided after the plan
was confirmed. 12 The court decided in favor of the second-lien creditors. In
part, the judge reached this decision because he concluded that the
ambiguous language of the intercreditor agreement should be read in favor
of preserving second-lien creditors’ bankruptcy rights. 13 According to the
judge, it was not “clear beyond peradventure” that the second-lien creditors
had waived their rights in the agreement.14
In the RadioShack case, 15 a bankruptcy judge took a notably different
approach. The electronics retailer entered bankruptcy with two groups of
secured creditors and an intercreditor agreement defining the rights of the
two groups. 16 Adding to the complexity, the creditors within each secured
lender group divided themselves into classes via separate side agreements
(called agreements among lenders, or AALs). 17 In one of the AALs, the
party in a junior priority position, the hedge fund Salus Capital Partners,
was prohibited from objecting to any sale that the senior priority creditors,
including the hedge fund Cerberus Capital Management, agreed to.18 When
Salus raised an objection to a motion by RadioShack to sell its assets,
Cerberus invoked the AAL to argue that Salus had no standing to object
because Cerberus favored the sale. 19 In this case, the judge specifically
enforced the agreement to deny standing to Salus because the AAL
prohibited the objection.20
10

Id. at 746.
Id. (describing the alleged breaches of the intercreditor agreement).
12
See Order Denying Remand Motion, BOKF, N.A. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 14-08247
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2014).
13
See MPM Silicones, 518 B.R at 750.
14
Id. (quoting In re Boston Generating, LLC, 440 B.R. 302, 319 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010)).
15
In re RadioShack Corp., 550 B.R. 700 (Bankr. D. Del. 2016).
16
See id. at 704–07; Transcript of Hearing at 19, RadioShack Corp., 550 B.R. 700 (Bankr. D. Del.
(No. 15-10197) (March 30, 2015); Sarah R. Borders et al., Client Alert: Recent Unitranche Issues in the
&
SPALDING
(June
1,
2015),
RadioShack
Bankruptcy
Case
1,
KING
http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/recent-unitranche-issues-in-the-87848/
[https://perma.cc/J92MKGF9].
17
See Transcript of Hearing, supra note 16, at 5; Borders et al., supra note 16, at 1.
18
See Transcript of Hearing, supra note 16, at 62–63; Borders et al., supra note 16, at 2.
19
See Transcript of Hearing, supra note 16, at 63; Borders et al., supra note 16, at 2.
20
See Transcript of Hearing, supra note 16, at 63–64. Even in RadioShack, the court did not
consistently enforce intercreditor agreements. The court did not resolve a related dispute under the other
AAL, which had the effect of declining to enforce that agreement. RadioShack is discussed in more
detail in Section I.C and Section IV.C., infra.
11
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Disputes like these raise a host of questions that have not yet been
consistently or coherently resolved. Should a side agreement be treated like
any other contract? When a party agrees to waive a right it would otherwise
have in bankruptcy, should the waiver be enforceable? Should courts
interpret ambiguously drafted terms against the party seeking to get around
the Bankruptcy Code? If the waiver of the right is enforceable, what
remedies should be available—should the right be specifically enforceable,
as in RadioShack, or enforceable with damages, as was sought in
Momentive? And procedurally, should these disputes be adjudicated inside
or outside the bankruptcy courts?
This Article provides a framework for thinking about these questions.
Using simplified examples, we demonstrate the beneficial and harmful
potential of side agreements. We will focus on intercreditor agreements
involving a senior creditor and a junior creditor, but the basic principles are
general enough to apply to side agreements involving other subsets of
stakeholders as well. In a so-called “bad boy” agreement, for instance, a
debtor agrees with a subset of creditors not to file for bankruptcy. 21 Another
example is special purpose securitization vehicles, whose organizational
documents keep some creditors silent by restricting their ability to
negotiate with the debtor.22
On the benefit side, we show that side agreements can provide
effective workarounds for some of the inefficient mandatory terms in the
Bankruptcy Code, as well as solve problems caused by the inherent
incompleteness of contracts. A side agreement can limit the ability of a
party to use a bankruptcy right opportunistically against its counterparty,
where the benefit to exercising a right for one party reduces value to the
side agreement coalition as a whole. To give a concrete example, a secondlien creditor might agree not to raise any objections that—although allowed
under the Bankruptcy Code—would stall a value-maximizing sale process.
On the cost side, however, we show that side agreements will not
always maximize the value for all stakeholders. The parties to a side
agreement will only maximize their joint value; they will not take into
account the effect of their agreement on the company’s other stakeholders.
And they may even use side agreements to impose negative effects on
those outside stakeholders in an attempt to extract value from them. We
21

See, e.g., David Djaha et al., Protect Yourself from the ‘Bad Boys’, N.Y. L. J., (Aug. 13, 2012),
http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202566826929/Protect-Yourself-From-the-Bad-Boys
[https://perma.cc/J9Q5-NSRC] (discussing the use of bad boy agreements).
22
See, e.g., In re Extended Stay Inc., 435 B.R. 139, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (discussing the plaintiffs’
argument that the defendants violated a side agreement prohibiting them from directly negotiating with
creditors).
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show that such extraction attempts can result in parties contracting for
specific performance of a right, or excessive stipulated damages, when
expectation damages would be preferred from an overall efficiency
standpoint. These side agreements, though profitable for the parties to the
agreement, can shut down opportunities in the bankruptcy proceeding for
one or more parties to strike efficiency-enhancing deals to defect. This in
turn lowers the expected value that can be recovered through the
bankruptcy process and increases the ex ante cost of finance for debtors. 23
In light of the potential problems associated with enforcing side
agreements as written, we develop a simple proposal that honors the intent
of the parties to the side agreement and preserves the efficiency benefits
they create, while limiting the negative consequences. We propose the
following: if a side agreement is unlikely to cause value-destroying
externalities, 24 a court should enforce the agreement according to its terms,
including stipulated damage clauses or specific performance requirements.
But if there is a nontrivial potential for value-destroying externalities, the
court should limit a nonbreaching party’s remedy to its expectation
damages.
The above solution implies that, where there is a nontrivial possibility
of externalities, a court should hear an objection or allow an action that
would otherwise be permitted under the Bankruptcy Code, even if the
parties’ intercreditor agreement prohibits it. The court should not block
defections that violate an intercreditor agreement unless they otherwise
conflict with the Bankruptcy Code. Expectation damages for breach should
be payable to the nonbreaching party, but the court can decide these
damages independently from, and later than, the objection itself.
The efficiency benefits of expectation damages are well understood in
the literature on contracts: when properly calculated, they force the
promisor to internalize the costs imposed on the promisee. 25 Although our
proposal to apply similar logic to intercreditor agreements in bankruptcy
may seem novel—and it is quite different than the approach that appears to
be emerging in the case law—bankruptcy law uses precisely the same
strategy when dealing with other related issues. Outside of bankruptcy, for
23

The general law-and-economics view of bankruptcy worries about the ex ante cost of finance.
Bankruptcy rules that reduce the total ex post value of a bankruptcy estate create problems because they
increase the cost of ex ante financing. See Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms,
108 YALE L.J. 573, 579–80 (1998).
24
Value-destroying externalities occur when enforcing the side agreement negatively affects the
recovery of a stakeholder who is outside the side agreement.
25
See, e.g., Daniel Markovits & Alan Schwartz, The Myth of Efficient Breach: New Defenses of the
Expectation Interest, 97 VA. L. REV. 1939 (2011) (summarizing recent debate and defending the
traditional view).
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instance, a secured creditor has the right to seize its collateral when the
debtor defaults. 26 Inside bankruptcy, the mandatory automatic stay prevents
collateral seizure, and the secured creditor is promised “adequate
protection” payments if the collateral begins to lose value.27 This is justified
on the ground that when bargaining among all creditors is not possible, the
debtor and the secured creditor do not internalize the effects of seizure on
the other creditors. Thus, the Bankruptcy Code replaces a specific
performance right (the right to seize collateral) with damages (adequate
protection payments), unless the risk that the seizure will affect the other
creditors is negligible.28 A side agreement usually does not threaten to
remove a key asset, but it may remove a key party (the silent creditor) from
negotiations, which can have similar negative effects on third-party
stakeholders.
In the bankruptcy setting, we show that fully enforced expectation
damages (ED) invite efficient, value-creating defections, provided that: (a)
the promisor in the side agreement and the third party can negotiate
efficiently—that is, they reach a deal to defect whenever it increases their
joint payoff; and (b) the third party’s interests are aligned with the parties
outside the side agreement. These conditions will not hold in all
circumstances, so ED is not a panacea for all coordination problems in
bankruptcy; but, importantly, we show that—given the specific dynamics
of bankruptcy procedure—the costs of ED’s imperfections are likely to be
lower than the costs of specific performance and stipulated damages. 29
Throughout the discussion, we consider the controversies over side
agreements and defections that lie at the heart of a series of prominent
recent cases. Although courts have not yet developed a settled approach to
these issues, they are increasingly trying to regulate these arrangements by
narrowly construing the contractual language and only enforcing language
that is “clear beyond peradventure.” 30 Our model suggests that this
26

See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 9-609, 9-610 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2001) (setting forth
state law remedies of foreclosure and sale of collateral under the Uniform Commercial Code).
27
11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (2012). As another example, plans of reorganization can be “crammed
down” even when classes of creditors dissent, replacing the right to veto a plan with judicially valued
compensation in the form of new securities. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (2012).
28
For discussion of the liquidity-enhancing benefits of these rules, see Kenneth Ayotte & David A.
Skeel Jr., Bankruptcy Law as a Liquidity Provider, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1557 (2013); George G. Triantis,
Financial Slack Policy and the Laws of Secured Transactions, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 35 (2000). Section
362(d)(2) requires that the judge lift the stay if the debtor: (a) has no equity in the collateral; and (b) the
collateral is not necessary to an effective reorganization. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2). When both of these
conditions hold, the effect of collateral seizure on third party creditors is small, and hence, the specific
performance right of the secured creditor is honored.
29
See infra Section III.A.
30
In re Boston Generating, LLC, 440 B.R. 302, 319 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010).
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approach is a mistake and that it could have serious unintended
consequences. The parties, desiring an enforceable but narrow side
agreement, may be compelled to draft something broader or allencompassing to get courts to specifically enforce the agreement. This
could result in the paradoxical outcome that courts do not enforce narrowly
tailored efficient side agreements but fully enforce (with specific
performance) broad side agreements that create serious externalities. Our
model suggests that courts should focus primarily on the remedy, rather
than on the scope of the contractual language.
Our model also provides a simple framework for resolving the
increasingly vexing questions of whether intercreditor agreement disputes
should be resolved by the bankruptcy court or outside bankruptcy, and
whether forum selection clauses should be enforced. If the nonbreaching
party asks for expectation damages, the bankruptcy court has no particular
expertise and should defer to forum clauses that call for a different forum.
Where specific performance or stipulated damages are at issue, by contrast,
our model suggests that the dispute should be resolved exclusively in
bankruptcy proceedings.
We are not the first to consider the issues surrounding intercreditor
agreements and propose recommendations. In a recent paper, Edward
Morrison argues, as we do, that enforcement of intercreditor agreements
should turn on the presence or absence of externalities. 31 He identifies rules
of thumb judges can use to guide decisions on enforcement and potential
actions (such as vote assignment), in which externalities are more or less
likely to be present.32 Our analysis adds to this understanding of side
agreements in three ways. First, our theory analyzes the potential for deals
that defect from side agreements, an important phenomenon in many
recent, prominent Chapter 11 cases. Second, we analyze the incentives of
parties to side agreements at the drafting stage—including incentives to
extract value from nonparties—in order to better understand why
externalities might exist in the first place. Third, we generate several new
proposals that can guide judicial enforcement of side agreements and
defections from those agreements and address the complicated
jurisdictional questions that have arisen.
The Article will proceed as follows. In Part I, we summarize some of
the recent prominent cases involving intercreditor agreements and note the
common themes in these cases. In Part II, we present our theoretical
31

Edward R. Morrison, Rules of Thumb for Intercreditor Agreements, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 721.
See id. at 730–33 (describing courts’ ability to delay making a decision on an intercreditor
agreement as a key rule of thumb); id. at 732 (discussing the risk of externalities with vote assignment
provisions).
32
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framework, which uses a series of simple numerical examples to generate
intuitions about the costs and benefits of enforcing intercreditor
agreements. In Part III, we discuss normative implications of the theory
and, in Part IV, we apply the theory to recent cases including those
discussed in Part I. Part V provides additional analysis of expectation
damages before briefly concluding.
I.

THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW

Subordination agreements, which subordinate the claims of one
creditor to those of another, have been a familiar feature of bankruptcy for
decades. The Bankruptcy Code explicitly endorses these arrangements,
stating that a subordination agreement “is enforceable in a case under this
title to the same extent that such agreement is enforceable under applicable
nonbankruptcy law.” 33 Because many intercreditor agreements do more
than simply subordinate second-lien creditors, however, courts cannot point
to the Bankruptcy Code’s prosubordination agreement policy as resolving
the senior and junior creditors’ disputes over the intercreditor agreement.
They must determine whether the agreement covers the dispute in question,
and if it does, whether the term in question is permissible.
Bankruptcy courts’ handling of these disputes has been quite
inconsistent. On one extreme, some courts have flat-out refused to enforce
provisions that seem to interfere with the Chapter 11 negotiating and voting
process. In In re 203 North LaSalle Street Partnership, 34 for instance, the
court invalidated a provision that transferred a junior creditor’s voting
rights to the senior creditor. 35 On the other extreme, some courts have fully
enforced these provisions. 36 In the middle are cases where the courts have
been less straightforward, paying lip service to enforcement while
nonetheless finding ways to conclude that an enforcing senior creditor (the
promisee) is not entitled to relief. 37 Finally, we suspect that some courts are

33

11 U.S.C. § 510(a) (2012).
246 B.R. 325 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2000).
35
See also In re SW Hotel Venture, LLC 460 B.R. 4 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part, sub nom. In re SW Boston Hotel Venture, LLC, 479 B.R. 210 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2012) (also refusing
to enforce a vote assignment provision), vacated, 748 F.3d 393 (1st Cir. 2014).
36
See, e.g., In re Aerosol Packaging, LLC, 362 B.R. 43 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2006) (enforcing vote
assignment).
37
Morrison divides the intercreditor agreement cases into three categories: those that refuse to
enforce the agreements because they are inequitable or otherwise interfere with the bankruptcy process,
those that enforce the agreements, and those that “take[] the middle road.” Morrison, supra note 31, at
725. In the middle-road cases, courts purport to enforce provisions that require the promisor to stay
silent in the case but nevertheless consider the merits of the promisor’s motion or objection. Id. at 723–
25 (citing, among others, In re Erickson Ret. Cmtys., LLC, 425 B.R. 309, 316–17 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
34
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just reaching pragmatic outcomes regardless of the provisions in the side
agreements. 38
In the discussion that follows, we try to make sense of three leading
recent cases: In re Boston Generating, LLC (Boston Generating), 39 In re
MPM Silicones, LLC (Momentive), 40 and In re RadioShack Corp
(RadioShack). 41 Although the cases continue to reach divergent outcomes,
several recurring themes seem to be emerging.
A. The Boston Generating Approach: “Clear Beyond Peradventure”
The decision in Boston Generating has set the tone for courts’ recent
handling of disputes over the implications of intercreditor agreements.
Boston Generating was a wholesale electricity provider in Boston and its
environs, with the third largest generation operations in New England. 42 For
eighteen months before its August 18, 2010 bankruptcy filing, the debtors
sought to find a buyer for most or all of their assets.43 After initially
contacting 199 potential buyers, Boston Generating winnowed the potential
bidders down to 6, actively negotiated with 2, and selected Constellation
Holdings. 44 Under the parties’ agreement, Constellation would pay $1.1
billion for the assets of Boston Generating, and Boston Generating would
file for bankruptcy and seek prompt bankruptcy court approval of the sale
under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code.45
As of the bankruptcy filing, Boston Generating had $2 billion of debt,
including $1.13 billion of first-lien debt under a First Lien Credit
Agreement, $350 million of second-lien debt, and $422 million of
unsecured debt. 46 Under the proposed sale, the first-lien creditors would be
paid nearly in full, while second-lien creditors and unsecured creditors
would receive little or nothing. 47 Not surprisingly, the second-lien creditors
were much less enthusiastic about the proposed sale than the first-lien
creditors. When the debtors asked the bankruptcy court to approve the sale
to Constellation after an auction process that produced one other bid, the
2010), which held that the subordinated creditors were precluded by their intercreditor agreement from
seeking an examiner but nevertheless considered the merits of the examiner request).
38
See infra Section I.C.
39
440 B.R. 302 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010).
40
In re MPM Silicones, LLC, 518 B.R. 740 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014).
41
550 B.R. 700 (Bankr. D. Del. 2016).
42
Boston Generating, 440 B.R. at 308.
43
Id. at 310.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id. at 308–09.
47
Id. at 310.
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agent for the second-lien creditors and several of the second-lien creditors
objected. 48 The agent for the first-lien creditors pointed to the parties’
intercreditor agreement as precluding the objection because the agreement
gave the first-lien creditors the exclusive right to “enforce rights, exercise
remedies . . . and make determinations” regarding the parties’ collateral.49
The agent for the second-lien creditors countered that its objection was not
interfering with the first-lien creditors’ exclusive enforcement rights and
that it was simply making an objection that ordinary unsecured creditors
make, as permitted by the agreement. 50
The bankruptcy court made two determinations, each of which has
important implications for the treatment of intercreditor agreements. The
court first ruled that the second-lien creditors could press their objection,
despite the first-lien creditors’ exclusive right to exercise remedies.51 The
court based this conclusion in part on a puzzling decision by the first-lien
agent to stipulate that the first-lien creditors’ consent to (and other
involvement in) the sale of assets did not constitute an “exercise of
remedies” under the intercreditor agreement.52 But the court also
emphasized the lack of clarity in the parties’ agreement. “If a secured
lender seeks to waive its rights to object to a 363 sale,” the bankruptcy
judge wrote, “it must be clear beyond peradventure that it has done so.” 53
The court contrasted the parties’ agreement with the American Bar
Association’s (ABA) model intercreditor agreement in this regard. Unlike
the ABA model agreement, which explicitly states that the second-lien
agent is deemed to consent to a section 363 sale that the first-lien agent
approves, the “language in the Intercreditor Agreement [in this case] falls
short of such clarity.” 54
The court’s second ruling pointed in the opposite direction. Although
the judge permitted the second-lien creditors to object, she nevertheless
allowed the sale to go through. The judge gave the second-lien creditors
their day in court but did not let the objections derail the asset sale that
Boston Generating had spent nearly two years arranging. 55
The ultimate outcome of the hearing makes the contrast between
Boston Generating and two earlier cases that had enforced the literal terms
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
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Id. at 319.
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of intercreditor agreements less stark than it initially appears. In In re
Erickson Retirement Communities, LLC 56 and In re Ion Media Networks,
Inc., 57 several bankruptcy courts relied on the explicit language of the
intercreditor agreement to deny standing to second-lien creditors.
Distinguishing the two cases, the Boston Generating court pointed out that
the intercreditor agreements in the earlier cases were much clearer. But the
courts in the two earlier cases also seem to have been mindful of the effect
their rulings would have on the outcome of each case. In both Erickson and
Ion Media Networks, the second-lien creditors’ actions threatened to bog
down a case that was otherwise close to resolution. By denying standing in
Erickson, the court avoided statutory language that suggests an examiner
must be appointed if a creditor requests one.58 Similarly, in Ion Media,
denying standing silenced a second-lien creditor that was far out of the
money and appeared to be objecting in the hope of being bought off. 59 By
contrast, in Boston Generating, the court allowed the objection but did not
permit it to derail the debtor’s proposed sale.
Boston Generating places a premium on careful drafting of
intercreditor agreements and also suggests that bankruptcy courts may be
keeping one eye on the pragmatic implications of permitting second-lien
creditors to take action in the face of contractual language that appears to
require their silence. In this case and the related Erickson and Ion Media
Networks cases, the courts focused primarily on the scope and validity of
the agreements, without carefully considering the choice of remedy that
courts would provide if they concluded that the agreements were
enforceable. 60
56

425 B.R. 309 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2010).
419 B.R. 585 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
58
See 11 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (2012). For evidence that courts often decline to appoint examiners even
when ostensibly required to appoint them, see Jonathan C. Lipson, Understanding Failure: Examiners
and the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large Public Companies, 84 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1 (2010).
59
See, e.g., Ion Media, 419 B.R. at 597–98 (noting, as it considered the language of the agreement,
that even the first-lien creditors were likely to receive only a fraction of what the $850 million they
were owed because the debtor was not worth more than $310–$455 million).
60
Boston Generating and the two prior cases also raise the question of just what specific
performance means. In Ion Media, the effect of specific performance was not clear given that the court
was fully informed about the objection it declined to hear and essentially addressed the objections. See
id. at 598 (stating that “[d]espite the determination that Cyrus lacks standing to object to the Plan, the
Court recognizes that it has an independent obligation to review the Plan to make sure that it satisfies
the standards for plan confirmation”). In Erickson, specific performance may have made a more
tangible difference because it removed a demand for an examiner. But here too, the court essentially
considered the requested action before concluding that the request was precluded by the parties’
intercreditor agreement. See 425 B.R. at 316–17 (declining to appoint examiner). We will attempt to
sort out these issues later in this Article. See infra Section III.B (providing framework for determining
the parties’ rights).
57
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B. The Intercreditor Dispute in Momentive
The Momentive bankruptcy was hotly contested from the outset, and
it produced important decisions on difficult issues that might have been
avoided if the parties had managed to settle, as the bankruptcy judge
strongly hinted they should do. Momentive, a silicone and quartz
manufacturer that had been acquired in 2006 by Apollo Global
Management, the well-known private equity fund, proposed a “deathtrap”
reorganization plan. The “deathtrap” reorganization plan gave its senior
creditors a choice between either accepting the plan, which promised
payment in cash in full but required the creditors to waive a $200 million
make-whole claim, 61 or rejecting the plan, asserting their make-whole
claim, and receiving replacement notes plus the cramdown rate of interest.62
Although the senior creditors rejected the plan, the bankruptcy court held
that they were not entitled to a make-whole payment and confirmed the
proposed plan under the cramdown provision. 63 The senior creditors then
brought a state court damages action against the junior creditors under the
parties’ intercreditor agreement. The senior creditors argued that the junior
creditors’ support for the reorganization plan violated the agreement and
that any distributions to the junior creditors needed to be turned over to the
senior creditors because the agreement required that the senior creditors be
paid in full before the junior creditors received any distribution. The junior
creditors responded by removing the litigation to federal court and having it
referred to the bankruptcy court. 64
61
A “make-whole” provision requires a breaching promisor to pay a fee designed to compensate
the promisee for profits lost as a result of the breach. In a loan contract, the lost profits often consist
largely of not-yet accrued interest payments. Some courts have enforced make-whole payments, see,
e.g., In re Energy Future Holdings Corp., 842 F.3d 247, 261 (3d Cir. 2016) (holding that the makewhole provision must be honored); In re Sch. Specialty, Inc., No. 13-10125 (KJC), 2013 WL 1838513,
at *17–19 (Bankr. D. Del. Apr. 22, 2013) (concluding that a make-whole provision was a legitimate
liquidated damages provision, not unmatured interest, which would be precluded by section 502(b)(2)),
while other courts have rejected them, see, e.g., In re MPM Silicones LLC, 531 B.R. 321, 336
(S.D.N.Y. 2015) (holding that a make-whole provision was not enforceable because it did not “clearly
and unambiguously call for the payment of the make-whole premium in the event of an acceleration of
debt”), aff’d No. 15-1682, 2017 WL 4772248 (2d Cir. Oct. 20, 2017) .
62
MPM Silicones, 531 B.R. at 326; see also Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 479 (2004)
(holding that the cramdown rate of interest can be determined by using the formula approach, which
starts with the prime rate and adjusts based on risk of nonpayment).
63
MPM Silicones, 531 B.R. at 332.
64
An obvious question raised by this sequence of events is why the senior creditors brought a
damages action rather than seeking to prevent Momentive from confirming a reorganization plan that
would give distributions to the junior creditors. One possible explanation for the senior creditors’
approach is that courts generally have not required that a reorganization plan comply with an
intercreditor agreement so long as the promisee’s rights under the agreement are preserved. See
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (2012) (requiring a court to confirm a nonconsensual plan notwithstanding the
enforceability of subordination agreements); see also, e.g., In re Croatan Surf Club, LLC, No. 11-
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The senior creditors’ alternative strategy failed. Explicitly endorsing
the Boston Generating standard that the waivers of junior creditors’ rights
must be “clear beyond peradventure,” the bankruptcy court rejected each of
the senior creditors’ arguments. 65 Much as the agreement in Boston
Generating failed to specify that junior creditors could not object to a
section 363 sale that senior creditors approved, the agreement here focused
on the parties’ collateral and liens, rather than on their right to payment.
“[T]he ICA is very clearly an intercreditor agreement pertaining to the
parties’ rights in respect of shared collateral,” the court concluded. 66 “That
is the overall context of the Agreement, and it is in that context that the
complaints’ claims should be evaluated.” 67 Because the junior creditors’
support for Momentive’s plan did not interfere with the senior creditors’
liens or collateral in any way, the junior creditors’ actions were not barred
by the intercreditor agreement. 68 The court also ruled that the junior
creditors were entitled to contest the amount of the senior creditors’ claims
because the agreement lacked the explicit “silent seconds” lien provisions
often included in intercreditor agreements.69
C. The Intercreditor Dispute in RadioShack
In RadioShack, the creditor coalitions were more complex than in any
of the cases discussed thus far. 70 RadioShack had two main groups of
secured lenders: the ABL lender group, which held a first lien on
RadioShack’s liquid assets and a second lien on its intellectual property
securing a $585 million obligation, and SCP, which held a second lien on
the liquid assets and a first lien on the intellectual property securing a $250
million loan. 71 Each of the loans was divided into multiple tranches. The
00194-8-SWH, 2011 WL 5909199, at *2 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Oct. 25, 2011) (“[A] court can confirm a
plan which disrupts bargained for priority, and thus is inconsistent with the terms of a subordination
agreement, as long as it is fair and equitable and does not discriminate unfairly.”); In re TCI 2 Holdings,
LLC, 428 B.R. 117, 140–41 (Bankr. D. N.J. 2010) (noting that section 1129(b) provides for
confirmation of plans even when parties have violated intercreditor agreements on supporting the plan);
see also In re Tribune Co., 472 B.R. 223, 241 (Bankr. D. Del. 2012) (citing TCI 2 Holdings, 428 B.R. at
141), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 12-CV-1072 GMS, 2014 WL 2797042 (D. Del. June 18, 2014),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom., In re Tribune Media Co., 799 F.3d 272 (3d Cir. 2015).
65
MPM Silicones, 518 B.R. at 750 (citing In re Boston Generating, LLC, 440 B.R. 302, 319
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010)).
66
Id. at 746.
67
Id.
68
Id. at 750–52.
69
Id. at 752 (contrasting the agreement here to the much more restrictive provisions in the
agreement in In re Erickson Ret. Cmtys., LLC, 425 B.R. 309, 313 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2010)).
70
For an overview of the loans and the dispute discussed in the text that follows, see Borders et al.,
supra note 16.
71
In re RadioShack Corp., 550 B.R. 700, 703 (Bankr. D. Del. 2016).
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relationship between the ABL and SCP loans was coordinated by an
intercreditor agreement, and relations within each lender group by AALs. 72
The ABL lender group was divided into two groups, referred to as the
first-out and second-out lenders. 73 The lightning rod for the dispute was a
proposal by Standard General, which held a “second out” position in the
ABL lien to buy a large number of RadioShack’s stores in partnership with
Sprint. Under the proposal, Standard General would be permitted to credit
bid its claim. 74 Although it was clear to everyone that RadioShack’s assets
needed to be sold, Salus, one of the lenders in the SCP lender group (and
the agent for the group’s loans), asked the bankruptcy court to prohibit
Standard General from credit bidding. Salus argued that Standard General’s
credit bid violated the priority terms of the intercreditor agreement between
the ABL and SCP group. 75 To further complicate matters, the first-out
lenders in the ABL group sided with Salus in opposing the bid by Standard
General. They argued that a credit bid by Standard General violated their
AAL with Standard General. 76
72

Id. at 704–05.
See id. at 705.
74
A “credit bid” is a bid that consists of a lien creditor’s promise to release some or all of its lien—
the amount to be released is the amount of the credit bid—if the bid is accepted, rather than a promise
of new consideration. See generally RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 566 U.S.
639 (2012) (holding that secured lenders must be permitted to credit bid a debtor proposes to sell assets
in connection with a Chapter 11 plan).
75
The basis for this objection was hotly contested. The ABL lenders had converted some of their
revolving loans into term loans. Salus argued that under the intercreditor agreement, the term loans
were junior in priority to the SCP loans. At the time of bankruptcy, $129 million of the term loans had
been repaid and $103 million remained outstanding. Salus argued that it was entitled to the $129 million
that had been paid to the ABL lenders and that the $103 million outstanding debt was junior to the SCP
loan and therefore could not be credit bid. See generally Debtors’ Combined Motion for Entry of
Orders: (I) Establishing Bidding and Sale Procedures; (II) Approving the Sale of Assets; and (III)
Granting Related Relief, RadioShack Corp., 550 B.R. 700 (No. 15-10197); Objection of Salus Capital
Partners, LLC to Debtors’ Sale Motion, RadioShack Corp., 550 B.R. 700 (Bankr. D. Del. 2016) (No.
15-10197); Statement of Cerberus Lenders in Support of Sale to General Wireless, Inc., RadioShack
Corp., 550 B.R. 700 (Bankr. D. Del. 2016) (No. 15-10197); Debtors’ Consolidated Reply to Objections
to Going Concern Sale, RadioShack Corp., 550 B.R. 700 (Bankr. D. Del. 2016) (No. 15-10197); see
also Transcript of Hearing, supra note 16; Transcript of Hearing, RadioShack Corp., 550 B.R. 700 (No.
15-10197) (March 31, 2015).
76
The details of the interplay of the indemnity and the credit bid are complex. At its most simple,
the term loan priority litigation between Salus on the one side and the ABL group on the other could
result in the ABL group owing $129 million to Salus after the sale. The first-out lenders were concerned
that if the sale went through before that litigation was resolved, they would be on the hook for some or
all of that $129 million. They claimed that the possibility that they would be liable without protection
violated their AAL with Standard General, which provided that Standard General could not recover
anything (and thus, they argued, could not credit bid) until the first-out lenders were paid in full. They
read “paid in full” to include reassurance that they would not have to disgorge any payments they had
already received. Thus, the first-out lenders argued that Standard General had to resolve the $129
million litigation or provide reliable indemnity protection before the credit bid could go through. See
73
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Things were equally complicated on the SCP side. Another SCP group
lender, Cerberus, took Standard General’s side in the dispute. Cerberus
argued that the SCP group’s agreement among lenders prohibited Salus
from objecting to any sale that Cerberus had agreed to.77 While Cerberus
had initially consented to Salus’s objection, it changed its position shortly
before the sale hearings. 78 Salus argued that the initial consent barred
Cerberus from interfering with its objection. 79
The court resolved some of these disputes but not others. On the firstout lender’s objection to Standard General’s credit bid, the court merely
urged settlement and signaled that it was unlikely to grant the first-out
lenders’ full request to use the AAL to block the credit bid.80 The
bankruptcy court did, however, allow Cerberus to use its AAL to block
Salus’s objections to the sale. The court rejected Salus’s argument that
Cerberus was precluded from revoking its consent. “The plain language of
Section 14(c) [of the agreement among lenders] does not restrict Cerberus
from settling or otherwise changing its position or its mind,” the court said;
“and, indeed, to construe the document otherwise would be demonstrably
contrary to Cerberus’s presumed contractual expectations . . . .” 81 Cerberus
then had the right to agree to a sale, and that agreement blocked Salus from
asserting the SCP group’s rights to object to a sale. As a result, the sale
went forward.
The agreements in RadioShack arguably were clearer than the
agreement in Momentive, and Salus’s objection was more obviously
generally Debtors’ Combined Motion for Entry of Orders, supra note 75; Objection of the First Out
ABL Lenders to the Debtors’ Combined Motion for Entry of Orders: (I) Establishing Bidding and Sale
Procedures, (II) Approving the Sale of Assets and (III) Granting Related Relief, RadioShack Corp., 550
B.R. 700 (Bankr. D. Del. 2016) (No. 15-10197); Supplemental Brief in Support of the First Out
Lenders’ Objection to the Debtors’ Combined Motion for Entry of Orders: (I) Establishing Bidding and
Sale Procedures, (II) Approving the Sale of Assets and (III) Granting Related Relief, RadioShack Corp.,
550 B.R. 700 (Bankr. D. Del. 2016) (No. 15-10197); Response of Standard General L.P. to the
Objection of the First Out ABL Lenders to the Debtors’ Combined Motion for Entry of Orders: (I)
Establishing Bidding and Sale Procedures, (II) Approving the Sale of Assets and (III) Granting Related
Relief RadioShack Corp., 550 B.R. 700 (Bankr. D. Del. 2016) (No. 15-10197); Debtors’ Consolidated
Reply to Objections to Going Concern Sale, supra note 75; see also Transcript of Hearing, supra note
16; Transcript of Hearing, supra note 75.
77
Statement of Cerberus Lenders in Support of Sale to General Wireless, Inc., supra note 75, at 2–
3; see also Transcript of Hearing, supra note 16, at 22–25, 29–30.
78
See Statement of Cerberus Lenders in Support of Sale to General Wireless, Inc., supra note 75,
at 2–3 (filed five days before the sale hearings).
79
Id. at 34–37.
80
Id. at 72 (referring to requested relief as “silly”); id. at 87 (referring to demands as “screwy” and
noting a lack of enthusiasm for granting them); id. at 97 (noting “no possibility” of the request reserve
being posted); id. at 100 (noting “the fix I am in” with regard to granting the requested relief if the sale
of RadioShack is going to happen).
81
Id. at 63.
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precluded by the AAL terms. Perhaps these facts fully explain the court’s
ruling. But it does not seem coincidental that the ruling, together with the
court’s failure to rule on the first-out lenders’ objection to Salus’s credit
bid, also had the effect of removing potential obstacles to the best deal
available for selling RadioShack’s assets.
D. Implications
One obvious effect of these recent intercreditor disputes is to raise
significant questions about the assumption that intercreditor agreements
reduce transaction costs by keeping some parties silent. 82 Perhaps
intercreditor agreements will serve this function as they evolve, and as
courts interpret them in more consistent fashion. But the agreements have
prompted extensive litigation, as parties who agreed to be silent have raised
objections and entered into deals to defect that may have violated their side
agreements. They appear to have magnified transaction costs, rather than
reduced them.
In their handling of intercreditor agreement disputes, courts seem to
focus primarily on the scope of the agreement—that is, the question
whether the promisor has violated the agreement—and much less on the
question of what remedy is appropriate in the event of a breach. A common
theme in the cases is that courts read the terms of an intercreditor
agreement against the party who seeks to contract around the Bankruptcy
Code, unless it is “clear beyond peradventure.”83 This approach may reflect
the courts’ belief that enforcement of intercreditor agreements can have
deleterious effects on the bankruptcy process as a whole.
To increase the likelihood of enforcement, lenders can be expected to
make their future agreements broader. This in fact is precisely what
bankruptcy professionals have begun to advise. “In the future,” a prominent
law firm wrote after summarizing the RadioShack dispute, “senior creditors
would be well advised to demand specific and far-reaching protections that
cover more than pure collateral enforcement.”84 In response to the
Momentive court’s narrow reading of the lien subordination in the parties’
intercreditor agreement, another prominent law firm recommended that
senior creditors consider asking for, among other things, a broader
provision requiring “[t]urnover of distributions received in respect of the
82
See generally Morrison, supra note 31, at 726 (noting that cost savings are an important benefit
of intercreditor agreements, but also pointing out the potential for exploitation).
83
See, e.g., In re Boston Generating, LLC, 440 B.R. 302, 319 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010).
84
Michael A. Rosenthal & Josh Weisser, Silence is Golden: Second Lien Creditor Rights PostMomentive 3, GIBSON DUNN (Nov. 12, 2014), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/documents/
Silence-Is-Golden--Second-Lien-Creditor-Rights-Post-Momentive.pdf [https://perma.cc/95FZ-LQUM].
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junior lien creditor’s secured claim, regardless of source or form, as
opposed to only distributions of collateral or proceeds thereof.”85
It is not clear, however, that broader agreements will result in better
outcomes than the parties’ current agreements when all stakeholders are
taken into account. What is needed is a better understanding of the costs
and benefits of side agreements, and a theory as to whether and to what
extent the agreements should be enforced. In the next Part, we attempt to
provide such a theory. Our analysis suggests that courts should focus less
on the scope of the agreements and more on the appropriate remedy.
II. A SIMPLE THEORETICAL MODEL OF SIDE AGREEMENTS AND
DEFECTIONS
In this Part, we provide a simple theoretical framework that helps to
identify the costs and benefits of enforcing side agreements in the presence
of deals to defect. The theory, in turn, helps us understand the reasons
parties write these agreements and the sources of externalities that
bankruptcy law may help solve.
A. Background Principles
Underlying our analysis is the foundational normative theory of
bankruptcy known as the Creditors’ Bargain theory. 86 The Creditors’
Bargain theory says that an ideal bankruptcy outcome is one that
maximizes the expected value of the firm ex ante. 87 This translates to the
outcome that would be chosen by a sole owner—a hypothetical individual
who owns all of the firm’s assets on the bankruptcy petition date.88 The sole
owner would choose to dispose of the company’s assets—deciding whether
to reorganize, liquidate, or sell the assets as a going concern, and
determining the timing of this decision—in a way that maximizes the
company’s value. If the firm’s creditors could collectively agree to an
85
Damian S. Schaible & Kenneth J. Steinberg, Momentive: Intercreditor Agreement Issues 8,
POLK,
http://www.davispolk.com/sites/default/files/
DAVIS
Momentive.Intercreditor.Agreement.Issues.pdf [https://perma.cc/AM39-GWQW].
86
JACKSON, supra note 1; Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations
and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured
Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 97 (1984) (exploring the rights of secured creditors in
bankruptcy); Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors’
Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857 (1982) (developing the “Creditors’ Bargain theory”).
87
More precisely, the optimal bankruptcy framework will maximize the expected value of the firm
across all states of its existence. A bankruptcy rule that increased the value of the bankruptcy estate but
reduced the non-bankruptcy value (by distorting non-bankruptcy incentives) would violate the
Creditors’ Bargain theory if the reduction outweighed the increase.
88
See, e.g., Baird & Jackson, supra note 86, at 104–09 (describing how the decisionmaking of a
group of diverse owners should follow that of a sole owner).
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outcome once bankruptcy occurs, they would choose to act as a sole owner
would act because this would maximize the total recovery for all the
creditors. Thus, when we refer to an outcome as efficient or inefficient, the
sole owner’s decision will be our efficiency benchmark.
Corporate bankruptcy law is built on the premise that a debtor’s
contracts with its creditors will not necessarily lead to an efficient outcome
in bankruptcy because the creditors are not coordinated either ex ante,
when they lend to the debtor, or ex post, when bankruptcy occurs. 89
Bankruptcy’s automatic stay, which prevents creditors from seizing the
debtor’s assets upon bankruptcy, is one of bankruptcy law’s mandatory
(nonwaivable) terms. 90 It is based on the premise that a debtor and a
creditor would not be expected to contract for a stay on their own, even if
the collective creditor body would benefit from it. Nor will a creditor
voluntarily postpone collection at bankruptcy. She may instead have the
incentive to “race to the courthouse” to get a bigger share of the bankruptcy
estate for herself. Though this negatively affects the other creditors, the
debtor and the particular creditor will not, in general, be expected to
internalize any impact their contract has on the other stakeholders.91
The Creditors’ Bargain theory argues that when the sole owner
principle is at risk, the law is justified in altering the creditor’s rights. Of
particular importance for our analysis, the specific enforcement remedy the
creditor would be entitled to pursue outside bankruptcy is often replaced
with compensation that approximates the value of that remedy. A secured
creditor upon bankruptcy can no longer seize collateral, as it could do
outside bankruptcy, but the Bankruptcy Code gives the secured creditor the
right to receive adequate protection payments in lieu of the repossession
right. 92

89
See JACKSON, supra note 1. For skepticism about this traditional rationale, see, e.g., Randal C.
Picker, Security Interests, Misbehavior, and Common Pools, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 645, 669–70 (1992)
(arguing that security interests could be used to address collective action problems); Alan Schwartz, A
Normative Theory of Business Bankruptcy, 91 VA. L. REV. 1199, 1200 (2005) (questioning the need for
an expansive, state-supplied bankruptcy framework).
90
11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2012).
91
There are contractual devices to mitigate these externalities. An early creditor might include
covenants that limit the rights a borrower can grant subsequent lenders so as to minimize these
externalities. But these contractual devices are imperfect for both legal and practical reasons. See, e.g.,
Barry E. Adler & Marcel Kahan, The Technology of Creditor Protection, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1773
(2013) (analyzing the limits of covenants under existing law and advocating that they be given binding
effect).
92
11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (2012). This is not to say that U.S. law always provides the amount of
compensation that the Creditors’ Bargain theorist would advocate. Most notably, the Bankruptcy Code
does not give an undercollateralized secured creditor compensation for the lost time value of money.
See United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 382 (1988).
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B. Side Agreements and Defections
The background principles above are well known, and the use of
bankruptcy law to replace a specific performance remedy with damages
when the contract is between the debtor and a creditor is well accepted. But
what, if anything, changes when the contract is between two creditors? It is
less obvious that a side agreement between creditors implicates the same
issues. Because creditors compete in bankruptcy for the common pool of
debtor assets, it is clear that a contract with the debtor that provides better
treatment to one creditor can be to the detriment of the other creditors. But
the effect that a side agreement between creditors has on the nonparty
stakeholders is not as evident. If a side agreement merely reshuffles the
value that these parties are entitled to receive from the debtor, it is hardly
an issue for bankruptcy law to interfere with.
Moreover, these side agreements might be expected to help the
nonparty stakeholders. Side agreements should create incentives for the
parties to the agreement to deal with other parties in ways that maximize
the joint value of their collective claims. To be sure, the side agreements
will not be written in the interests of all creditors. But the agreements might
be expected to consolidate the side agreement parties to the equivalent of a
single party who owns all the claims of the coalition.
For example, suppose a senior creditor (S) and a junior creditor (J)
each make $100 loans secured by the same $200 asset, and they write an
intercreditor agreement that governs their relationship in bankruptcy. We
might expect that if bankruptcy occurs, the intercreditor agreement will be
written so that the S and J coalition will take the same actions that a single
secured creditor with a $200 loan against the asset would take. If the
intercreditor agreement transforms S and J into a single, unified actor, the
agreement could reduce fragmentation and increase the scope for valuecreating bargains with the debtor’s other creditors that bankruptcy law tries
to create. In such cases, the side agreements increase the ex ante value of
the debtor and are consistent with the Creditors’ Bargain theory.
The numerical examples below demonstrate, however, that this
intuition is only true in some, but not all, cases. When bargaining frictions
between the parties to a side agreement exist, the side agreement can create
negative externalities. Bargaining frictions might occur because the senior
loan position is held by a group of lenders in a syndicate, and the terms of
the syndicated loan agreement require a high degree of consensus among
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the lenders to restructure any key terms. 93 When bargaining is imperfect,
the side agreement may steer the parties toward outcomes that favor the
side agreement parties at the expense of the other nonparty stakeholders of
the debtor. The side agreement parties may even use the threat of negative
externalities to attempt to extract value from these stakeholders. This can
reduce overall value of the debtor’s estate in the bankruptcy process (and
thus increase ex ante cost of finance) when the parties’ attempts to keep
more of the surplus for themselves make it less likely that a value-creating
defection will occur through bargaining. In short, the side agreement
parties do not take into account the benefits that other stakeholders receive
from defections; hence, side agreements foreclose defections too often.
1. Setup and Assumptions
Suppose that parties S and J write a side agreement before bankruptcy.
The concrete example we have in mind is two creditors who agree to take a
senior (S) and a junior (J) lien on the same collateral, but the example can
apply to any two parties who are stakeholders in a company. S and J will be
expected to choose the terms that maximize the expected value of their
combined claims.
Party C is also a stakeholder in the company, but C is not a party to
the ex ante side agreement between S and J. This could occur because C
comes along after the agreement is signed, or because C became a creditor
before the transaction but was not actively monitoring the debtor and is
thus uninvolved with the negotiation of the side agreement when it
occurs. 94 C can be thought of as an unsecured creditor, whose interests are
often more aligned with J than with S. 95
In order for our problem to be interesting and realistic, there must be
some impediment to bargaining over outcomes in bankruptcy. The Coase
Theorem tells us that if all interested stakeholders bargain perfectly, the
sole owner principle will always hold and the efficient outcome will always
occur under any bankruptcy rules. 96 But bargaining frictions in bankruptcy
93
See, e.g., Amir Sufi, Information Asymmetry and Financing Arrangements: Evidence from
Syndicated Loans, 62 J. FIN. 629, 633 (2007) (discussing renegotiation rights of lenders in syndicated
loans).
94
To keep the discussion simple, we do not explicitly involve the debtor in the negotiation of the
side agreement, but we suspect that this would not affect our analysis significantly. The debtor will
want to borrow at the lowest possible interest rate from S and J, so a side agreement between S and J
that maximizes the joint payoff of S and J in bankruptcy would be preferred by the debtor as well.
95
Junior lienholders in bankruptcy are also unsecured creditors to the extent that their collateral
value is less than what they are owed. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (2012). Thus, an unsecured creditor is
more likely to prefer the junior lienholder’s preferred action than the senior creditor’s preferred action
when they disagree.
96
See R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. ECON. 1, 2–8 (1960).
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are common and can occur for many reasons. One reason is coordination
problems caused by the fragmentation of claims. Large corporate loans are
often broken into pieces and held by many holders; in such cases,
coordinating these diverse holders can take time. We represent these
frictions in our theory in a simple fashion by assuming that one of the
parties is unable to bargain.
For the first part of our discussion, we consider examples in which S
will not be able to bargain, but C will be able to negotiate with J to agree to
a defection if a mutually beneficial deal is available. These assumptions
will not be true in all cases, and we relax them in subsequent examples, but
they track a common pattern in the cases where junior lien holders align
themselves with unsecured creditors after the debtor files for bankruptcy. 97
When analyzing the incentives of S and J to write the side agreement, we
will assume that S and J fully anticipate the parties that will be available to
bargain and the likely payoffs.
Some uncertainty will, however, remain over payoffs at bankruptcy.
We represent this through two possible “states of the world” that may occur
at bankruptcy, each with equal probability. The states can be analogized to
the future prospects of the company when the bankruptcy occurs, which
may be more or less favorable depending on conditions that are hard to
forecast in advance (at the time when the debtor borrows). We will suppose
that these conditions are known and observable to everyone on the
bankruptcy date, but they are sufficiently hard to describe in advance such
that S and J cannot write a contract that is conditioned on the state of the
world. 98
Whatever the state of the world, there will be two possible actions,
action R and action L, that can be chosen. For concreteness, one can think
of “R” as an action that makes a more prolonged reorganization process
more likely, while “L” is an action that might lead to a quicker sale or
liquidation. But, more generally, the model applies to any two possible
strategies that party J would be free to pursue absent a side agreement,
which are payoff-relevant and may affect what happens to the bankrupt
company’s assets. For example, suppose that the debtor, at the behest of the
senior creditor, makes a motion to liquidate the company and J has the

97
The Momentive and Boston Generating cases are examples in which a second-lien creditor took
actions that opposed a first-lien creditor and potentially stood to benefit the unsecured creditors. See
supra Sections II.A., II.B.
98
For example, the sale versus reorganization decision might depend on whether key employees
decide to stay with the company or go elsewhere. These key employees might be easily observable at
the time of bankruptcy but hard to identify in advance of bankruptcy when the intercreditor agreement
is written.
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option to be silent or exercise its legal right to raise an objection to the
liquidation. Alternatively, J might express an interest in providing a debtorin-possession loan that facilitates a reorganization plan proposed by C. 99
We make one final assumption concerning the bargaining process.
Whenever a deal to defect between J and C is possible, they will reach an
agreement that makes J and C collectively better off, and any surplus as a
result of the deal will be split evenly between J and C. The 50/50 split of
surplus is not essential to our results, but our results do rely importantly on
the idea that C captures at least some of the surplus in bargaining with J.
2.

Examples

Example 1: Side agreements align with efficiency
Good State (p=.5)

Bad State (1−p=.5)

R

L

R

L

S

120

200

120

200

J

20

0

20

0

C

70

0

10

0

S+J

140

200

140

200

S+J+C

210

200

150

200

We start with Example 1, which demonstrates the potential benefit of
side agreements. The table shows the direct payoffs—the payoffs that
would result absent any side agreements or defections—to parties S, J, and
C, which depend upon the state of the world and the chosen action. In this
example, S and J have divergent interests in both states: S prefers action L
and J prefers action R. Collectively, though, S and J’s total direct payoffs
favor action L in both states, as their collective payoff is 200 under action L
and 140 under action R. The good and bad states differ only in C’s payoff.
C’s direct payoff favors action R, and thus C’s preferences align with J’s.
To make an analogy between the example and the real world, party S
might favor a fast sale of the company in bankruptcy (action L), rather than

99

The setup here is based on the framework of incomplete financial contracts from Philippe
Aghion & Patrick Bolton, An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting, 59 REV. ECON.
STUD. 473, 475–79 (1992). To suit the issue at hand, we make important modifications to their setup,
including the existence of the side party and the assumption that S cannot bargain. Because the
bargaining parties are usually creditors, we do not assume that one of the two parties has no wealth,
which is the key source of bargaining frictions in the Aghion and Bolton model. See id. at 475.
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a long and protracted reorganization process (action R). J, the junior
creditor, may be “out of the money” and would not stand to receive any
payoff if the company is immediately sold. This might cause J to raise
objections or employ delay tactics to slow the process down. This might
benefit C, who represents unsecured or other lower priority creditors, who
also favor delay. But, importantly, J’s preferred action will hurt S more
than it helps J; thus, S and J have an incentive to strike a side agreement
that induces J to consider S’s payoff when it chooses an action.
a. Status quo actions
Under the status quo (no side agreements or defections), J would
choose action R in both states, to get 20 instead of 0. The S+J coalition
would receive a total payoff of 140 in both states.
This choice would be efficient in the good state because the total
payoffs of all parties (S+J+C) are 210 under action R and 200 under action
L. But it would be inefficient in the bad state, as action L generates a larger
payoff for all parties (200) than action R (150). Because the good state and
bad state occur with equal probability, the status quo would produce a total
expected payoff to all parties of 180.100
Now, let’s suppose that S and J can write a side agreement that
maximizes the expected payoff of the S and J coalition. We will first
analyze the best agreement S and J could write, assuming that the parties
provide that the agreement will be enforced via specific performance. We
will then do the same analysis assuming the parties contract for stipulated
damages, and we will compare the two possibilities to see which remedy S
and J will choose. We will then examine whether the choice leads to an
efficient outcome.
b. Side agreement enforced by specific performance (SP)
First, let’s consider the side agreement S and J would write, supposing
for the moment that any side agreement can be enforced specifically by S.
SP implies that S can require that J choose action L. Because the parties
anticipate S’s inability to negotiate, a decision to require action L will
always lead to action L being chosen, even if C were willing to pay any
amount to have the decision changed to R.
Under SP, S and J will write an agreement that requires that J choose
action L. S+J will prefer this outcome to the status quo with no side
agreement. J will agree to choose action L, and the S+J coalition will
receive 200 in both states. This is preferred to the status quo, where the S+J

100

The expected value is calculated by multiplying the probability of each state times the payoff of
all the parties (S+J+C) in that state and adding it up. In this case, we have .5×210 + .5×150 = 180.
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coalition would receive only 140 in both states. But it leads to an inefficient
outcome in the good state because the S+J coalition does not take C’s value
into account.
If the choice were between the status quo and a SP contract, the SP
contract is preferred from an efficiency perspective. The total expected
value under SP is 200, which is greater than the expected 180 payoff under
the status quo. It is not always true, however, that a SP contract is preferred
to the status quo from an efficiency standpoint whenever the parties choose
it. If, for example, we increase C’s payoff by more than 20 in both states
when action R is chosen, then the status quo payoff will be larger than 200.
Generally, SP contracts may increase or decrease efficiency relative to the
status quo because the parties do not internalize the effects of their contract
on C.
c. Side agreement enforced by stipulated damages (SD)
Using the numbers in Example 1, S and J can improve upon SP by
enforcing their side agreement through damages. Let “d” denote the SD
payment in the side agreement between S and J. When the agreement is
enforced through damages, J can choose to breach the side agreement and
choose action R if it is willing to pay d. This opens the door for C to make
a deal to defect with J to encourage the breach. Because S and J seek to
maximize their joint payoff, they will take any anticipated payment from C
to J into account when they decide on the right level of damages.
Here, S and J will write a contract that requires J to choose action L
and pay d = 90 to S if it chooses action R. They will choose damages of 90
because it elicits the maximum possible side payment from C to encourage
the breach in the good state. Their logic is as follows: In the good state, the
J+C coalition prefers action R to action L by 90: J prefers action R by 20,
and C prefers R by 70. Hence, C can only convince J to breach and choose
action R if C pays J the entire 70 it would gain from action R. If C offers
any payment lower than 70, J will perform under the side agreement and
choose action L. In the good state, then, J will breach the contract and
choose action R. C will make a side payment of 70 to J, and J will pay 90
in damages to S. In the good state, taking side payments into account, the
S+J coalition will get a total payoff of 210.
In the bad state, J will choose action L. In the bad state, C+J’s direct
payoffs would only increase by 30 if they chose action R, so it will not be
in their joint interest to pay 90 in damages to S. Hence, in the bad state, the
S+J coalition will get a total payoff of 200.
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d. Side agreement enforced by expectation damages (ED)
We just showed that when parties choose a SD contract, they will
choose to set damages at 90. This level of damages is higher than ED—the
damages that would give S the same payoff under breach that S would
receive when the contract is performed. Breach of a promise by J to choose
action L would reduce S’s payoff by only 80 in this example (200 – 120).
As is well known, ED gives J the incentive to breach efficiently. In this
example, J will choose to breach and choose action R in the good state, and
perform in the bad state. Though the parties choose damages that are higher
than ED, there are no efficiency consequences to that choice in this
example.
e. Takeaways from Example 1
There are several useful takeaways from our analysis in Example 1.
First, a side agreement with a SP remedy improves upon the status quo for
the S+J coalition, but it can be inefficient. This happens because the
defection creates negative externalities on the outside creditor (C) by
inducing action L in the good state. In this case, however, the optimal S+J
side contract will not include SP. S+J will prefer a contract SD that results
in action R being chosen in the good state and action L in the bad state,
which is consistent with efficiency.
Second, the S+J coalition chooses damages that are larger than ED. S
loses only 80 when action R is chosen, but S+J contract for d = 90 to divert
more value from C. In this case, there are no efficiency consequences to
this redistribution of value, so our normative theory is unconcerned with
the difference between SD and ED. 101 But as we will show in Example 2,
the difference can also matter for efficiency.

101

As a doctrinal matter, courts distinguish between appropriate liquidated damages provisions,
which are enforceable, and penalties, which are not. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 356 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). In theory, they might therefore refuse to enforce a provision that provided
for more than ED. But in practice, the lines are much fuzzier. See, e.g., Lake River Corp. v.
Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284, 1290 (7th Cir. 1985) (describing “[t]he distinction between a penalty
and liquidated damages [as] not an easy one to draw in practice”). In addition, a substantial body of
theoretical work concludes that SD that promise more than the promisee’s expected loss can be
efficient. See, e.g., Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just
Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach,
77 COLUM. L. REV. 554 (1977); Samuel A. Rea, Jr., Efficiency Implications of Penalties and Liquidated
Damages, 13 J. LEG. STUD. 147 (1984). We reach a similar conclusion in this Article, although our
model will often call for the promisee’s remedy to be limited to ED.
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Example 2: Side agreements lead to inefficiency; ED corrects the
inefficiency
Bad State (1−p=.5)

Good State (p=.5)
R

L

R

L

S

120

200

120

200

J

20

0

20

0

C

100

0

70

0

S+J

140

200

140

200

S+J+C

240

200

210

200

Example 2 is similar to Example 1. S’s and J’s payoffs have not
changed, but C has a stronger preference for action R in both states. In fact,
C’s preference is so strong that action R is now the efficient action in both
the good and bad states.
Because S’s and J’s payoffs have not changed, the status quo, SP, and
ED calculations are the same as under Example 1. But SD analysis is
different in an important way: the side agreement may set the damages too
high, leading to inefficient outcomes.
a. Stipulated damages
Under SD, the S+J coalition will face a trade-off when they set the
terms of the side agreement. If they want to divert the most surplus from C
in the good state, they will choose d = 120, so that (following Example 1) C
will pay J its entire surplus of 100 in order to induce a breach. But if they
do this, the damages will be so high that in the bad state, J will prefer not to
breach and will choose action L. S+J will receive a total of 240 in the good
state, and 200 in the bad state. Because the probability of each state is 50%,
the S+J coalition would get an expected payoff of 220.
Alternatively, S and J could set d = 90. This damage payment will
induce C to pay its full surplus of 70 in the bad state. In the good state,
however, C will keep some of its surplus. When C and J bargain to a deal
to defect in the good state, they will bargain to a 50/50 split of any surplus
that arises in moving from action L to action R. A quick calculation will
verify that C will pay a side payment of 85 to J, in order to induce J to
breach. 102
102
Under action R, J+C together would get a direct payoff of 120, but pay damages of 90 to S.
Under action L, they would get 0 and pay no damages. Thus, J+C would get a surplus of 120 – 90 = 30
from choosing action R. Under a 50/50 split, C would keep a surplus of 15. Since C’s direct payoff is
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Taking the side payments from C into account, if S+J choose d = 90,
they would get 120 + 20 + 85 = 225 in the good state and 210 in the bad
state. This has an expected value of 217.5. Because 217.5 less than 220,
S+J will set the damages high (d = 120). This leads to an inefficient choice
of action L in the bad state.
Example 2 illustrates that SD can lead to inefficient outcomes. In an
attempt to divert more of the surplus from C, S+J set the SD so high that C
chooses not to bargain with J in the bad state. As a result, action L is
chosen in the bad state instead of the efficient action R. 103
As in Example 1, if J were required to pay ED to S, it would pay only
200 – 120 = 80 to S upon breach. As with Example 1, ED again yields an
efficient outcome, as J will breach in both states and choose action R. In
fact, ED will always lead to efficiency whenever the outside party (C) can
freely bargain with J. To see this, note that C+J will strike a deal to defect
to induce J to breach whenever the net gains to C and J exceed the
damages. But the damages, because they are calculated using ED, are the
net losses to S. Hence, C and J will internalize the costs of their action on S,
making it the socially efficient choice.
b. Takeaways from Example 2
There are several new takeaways from Example 2. First, we saw in
Example 1 that SP contracts can be detrimental to efficiency because they
may inhibit a value-increasing bargain. In that example, the S+J coalition
would prefer the more efficient SD contract. Example 2, by contrast, shows
that a SD contract can lead to the same inefficiencies as SP. Again, the
reason for inefficient side agreements is externalities: S and J do not have
any incentive to consider the lost surplus that outside parties (C) sacrifice
when the opportunity for a value-creating defection is lost due to
excessively high damages. ED always lead to an efficient outcome,
provided that the parties outside the side agreement can bargain with J. But
the parties to the side agreement do not always have the incentive to write
an agreement that leads to efficient outcomes, even if such an agreement is
possible.
Before moving on to applications of the theory, we should note a few
caveats. In the two examples above, we have shown that SP contracts can
100 in the good state, this means that C must pay 100 – 15 = 85 to J. Notice that J’s total payoff is the
direct payoff plus the side payment minus the damages: 20 + 85 – 90 = 15.
103
This result is an application of a classic result in the antitrust literature, which shows that
exclusive dealing contracts between a buyer and a seller can have anticompetitive effects by blocking a
lower cost seller from entering a market. See Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, Contracts as a Barrier
to Entry, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 388, 388–89 (1987). To our knowledge, the application of this idea to
bankruptcy law is novel.
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be inefficient because they prevent efficient breaches too often. But we
haven’t yet shown why the parties would choose a SP contract,
notwithstanding its inefficiency. There are several reasons this could
happen. For example, the parties might think—correctly or incorrectly—
that courts will underestimate ED payable upon breach. SP can also be part
of an optimal contract when it is the promisee (S) and not the promisor (J)
who has the ability to bargain with an outsider to defect. We provide
examples of these possibilities in the Appendix. In these cases, it will often
be efficient to replace the parties’ chosen remedy with ED. It is important
to note, however, that replacing the parties’ choice of remedies with ED is
not a panacea for all efficiency problems and can lead to worse outcomes if
externalities are low.
Our theory points out the costs and benefits of side agreements, but it
notes that no alternative will provide a perfect solution for all sources of
inefficiency that might arise. In the next section, we argue that while ED is
not a perfect remedy, the Bankruptcy Code is better placed to handle the
costs of ED than it is to handle the costs that arise from SP and SD.
III. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS
We can apply the results of the above analysis to develop a new
framework for how courts should approach intercreditor disputes. To show
how this framework plays out, we will revisit the disputes that faced courts
in several recent high-profile bankruptcy cases 104 and then conclude by
considering a final key case that was not treated as an intercreditor dispute
but raises the same issues. We maintain our assumptions that bankruptcy
law has a primary goal of maximizing the value of the estate. We also
assume that there are, in some cases, limitations on the ability of parties to
bargain around certain outcomes. The key, then, is for judges to enforce
intercreditor agreements in the way most consistent with the model we
have laid out above.
A. Basic Principles
We briefly state some of the lessons from the model before delving
into the cases.
First, intercreditor agreements can reduce coordination problems
between the parties to an agreement, and can thus maximize the joint value
of their claims. This suggests that bankruptcy law need not interfere when
the intercreditor agreement presents no risk of externalities. We define
externalities as the potential to reduce the value of the estate for creditors
104
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who are not party to the intercreditor agreement (these creditors are the Cs
in our examples above).
Second, side agreements, written to maximize the bankruptcy payoff
of the parties to the agreement, can lead to inefficient outcomes when the
party with the right to enforce (the promisee, or S) cannot bargain
costlessly with other creditors in bankruptcy. Inefficiency can occur
whether the parties contract for SP or SD. The inefficiency arises because
the agreement between promisor (J) and promisee (S) does not take into
account the benefits that nonparties would realize if a beneficial deal to
defect were struck. Thus, the promisee and promisor may ex ante choose a
remedy that puts a potentially efficient defection at risk in order to capture
more of the surplus for themselves. Replacing SD or SD rights with ED
eliminates this problem and leads to efficient outcomes when nonparties
and the promisor can bargain, as long as the courts calculate ED properly.
Finally, ED do not solve all bargaining problems or eliminate all
externalities. ED do not always lead to efficiency when it is the promisor,
and not the promisee, which cannot bargain with outside parties. Moreover,
if damages are calculated in a biased way by courts, they will not give
proper incentives to the promisor to internalize the effects of her actions on
the promisee.
While our theory so far helps us understand the costs and benefits of
side agreements and various remedies in a qualitative way, it does not tell
us which costs and benefits are quantitatively more important. To answer
this question, we need to take a closer look at the costs associated with each
remedy in the bankruptcy context.
In bankruptcy proceedings, the errors introduced by SP and excessive
SD and the errors introduced by ED are different in kind. SP and excessive
SD force the promisor to under-assert its interests and rights. In some
cases, the agreement forces the promisor to go along with the promisee
even when it is in the promisor’s interest (either directly or because of a
potential deal to defect) to do otherwise. If SP is fully enforced, the court is
never exposed to information about the promisor’s interests in the estate.105
More importantly, the bankruptcy process relies crucially on self-interested
parties taking affirmative steps—such as providing new financing or
collaborating on a plan of reorganization—that can benefit the other
stakeholders. If some parties are silenced by a side agreement, there is little
a court can do to compensate other stakeholders for that silence.

105
If the court considers a junior creditor’s objection before ruling that it is precluded by an
intercreditor agreement, the information loss will be more limited. But even in this context, the court
will have less information than it would if the issue were fully argued.
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Another way to frame this idea, then, is to say that SP of an
intercreditor agreement removes a key party from the bankruptcy process.
This should be as concerning as actions that remove essential assets from
the estate. The Bankruptcy Code is designed around the concept of
coordinated behavior of stakeholders. At key junctures, the Bankruptcy
Code depends on the actions of one creditor providing benefits to the estate
as a whole. 106 Most obviously, section 1129(a)(10) works this way: A plan
of reorganization cannot be confirmed unless at least one class of impaired
creditors votes in favor of it. 107 This provides a compromise between
requiring unanimous (or majority) approval and allowing confirmation of
any plan. The Bankruptcy Code assumes that if an adversely affected class
of creditors votes in favor of a plan, that plan must be doing more than
merely shifting value to the debtor or to a senior class of creditors. But
intercreditor agreements could render this protection meaningless. If a class
of creditors is bound by an agreement to support a plan, their vote will not
provide any information about the propriety of the plan. And agreements
that silence other objections will have a similar effect.108
Limiting the promisee to ED, on the other hand, allows the promisor
to over-assert its interests and rights. Sometimes the promisor will assert its
interests even when they cut against the overall interest of the estate. For
instance, the promisor may object to a sale or vote in favor of a plan even
when doing so destroys value. 109 Given this possibility, the court will have
to weigh the asserted interests of the promisor against the asserted interests
of the promisee and the nonparty stakeholders. The difference, then, is
essentially one of false negatives (from the standpoint of efficiency, the
promisor is not asserting its rights enough) and false positives (from the
standpoint of efficiency, the promisor is asserting its rights too often).
These costs are different in kind because the false negatives destroy
value-enhancing agreements or deprive the court and the parties of the
information necessary to assess the impact of decisions on the value of the
estate. A side agreement might prohibit a junior lien creditor from
106
See generally Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy’s Quiet Revolution (Univ. Chi. Coase-Sandor Inst.
for Law & Econ. Research, Paper No. 755, 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2767057 [https://perma.cc/MKU8-MTCC] (discussing the bargaining process
and concessions between parties that ultimately lead to the emergence of a middle ground).
107
11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10) (2012).
108
Similarly, agreements that prohibit a creditor from providing debtor-in-possession (DIP)
financing would remove a viable lender from the process. Ultimately, any agreement that takes away a
party’s role in assessing the worth of the estate or a plan is an agreement that can harm the estate as a
whole.
109
The second-lien creditor’s numerous objections that threatened to hold up the reorganization of
ION Media are an example of over-assertion of rights to obtain a more preferable settlement. See supra
Section I.A.
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providing debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing. 110 If the prohibition is
specifically enforced, the value of the potential financing is never tested by
the market or the bankruptcy court. And that value may have been such that
it would have run to all stakeholders in the estate. Or a side agreement may
prevent a junior lien creditor from objecting to a sale or voting in favor of a
plan. Again, SP deprives the court of the information that would have been
contained in the objection or the favorable vote. That lack of information
may be detrimental to other dispersed and disorganized creditors who
cannot bring objections (or support) on their own behalf.
The false-positive costs from the over-assertion of rights are much
more readily mitigated by the Bankruptcy Code. The main cost is merely
that the court has to sift through extra information, which may impose a
delay. But that is not a major cost. Indeed, weighing the merits of selfinterested arguments of stakeholders is precisely what bankruptcy courts
and the Bankruptcy Code are set up to do. It is their primary function.
Moreover, the entire Bankruptcy Code envisions a process whereby the
court and stakeholders together resolve conflicting self-interests through a
process of structured negotiation and litigation. 111
Thus, the costs of false positives imposed by ED are relatively small.
When ED are inefficient, they merely require the court or the parties to do a
little more information filtering. But SP and excessive SD deprive the court
of valuable information and opportunities that could meaningfully enhance
the value of the estate.
B. The Proposed Framework
The practical implication of our analysis is that courts should award
ED rather than SP if there is a nontrivial likelihood of externalities. To be
clear, courts should always enforce agreements for at least ED. Courts that
have declined to give the promisee any remedy at all based on an unusually
stringent interpretation of the scope of a side agreement have done so
without justification. But SP or SD should only be available in the case

110
COMM’N TO STUDY THE REFORM OF CHAPTER 11, AM. BANKR. INST., 2012–2014 FINAL
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 75 (2014), http://abiworld.app.box.com/s/vvircv5xv83aavl4dp4h
[https://perma.cc/YG6L-VKKS]; Mark N. Berman & David Lee, The Enforceability in Bankruptcy
Proceedings of Waiver and Assignment of Rights Clauses Within Intercreditor or Subordination
Agreements, 20 NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. ART. 1 (2011).
111
A secondary cost is litigation costs. But if litigation costs are included as part of the expected
damages reward, this cost is born by the party who is over-asserting their rights and will deter overassertion. So, the real cost remains the court’s effort in deciding the matter. Moreover, for large
corporate bankruptcies, at least in relative terms, litigations costs are low. How Much does Corporate
Bankruptcy Cost?, NOVA L. GRP. (Nov. 5, 2009), http://novalawgroup.com/blog/?cat=28
[https://perma.cc/95VW-FHSZ].
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where it is plain that there is no externality on the estate—that the dispute
truly is contained in its impact to the creditors who were parties to the
agreement.
A court should, thus, first determine whether an intercreditor
agreement creates externalities. Because our analysis suggests that the costs
of limiting SP are small (essentially just marginal decision costs on the
court) relative to the costs of allowing it (depriving the court of information
and estate enhancing opportunities), we do suggest that courts should err on
the side of assuming there is an externality and limiting SP. SP should only
be allowable where the risk of externality is de minimis. When that is true,
the agreement should be enforced as written.
When, on the other hand, externalities are plausible, and a party seeks
SP, we should first consider how our proposal would work in an ideal
environment. If it were feasible, a perfect court would first assess whether
there are bargaining hurdles between nonparties and either the promisee or
the promisor. If bargaining hurdles exist only between the nonparties and
the promisee, then ED is always preferable (assuming ED can be
calculated). If there are bargaining hurdles between nonparties and the
promisor, then the right remedy is ambiguous and the court would have to
assess the actual level of externalities and only enforce agreements where
doing so minimized externalities. 112
This ideal-world prescription is unlikely to work in practice. It would
require a court to: (1) identify the relative bargaining hurdles and determine
which parties can effectively enter into deals to defect and (2) identify the
magnitude of externalities that would arise from enforcing a side agreement
and those that would arise from not enforcing it. It may be easy enough for
a court to assess whether externalities are likely to exist. But to ask a court
to dig into the precise nature and magnitude of bargaining hurdles as well
as externalities is essentially to ask the court to litigate out the value of the
estate. Once the court has determined which parties can bargain with each
other and the full effects that those bargains will have on all other
stakeholders in the estate, the court will have essentially determined which
paths are best for the estate and which are worst. It is meaningless at that
point to talk about specifically enforcing an agreement not to allow a junior
creditor to assert a right. If the right is beneficial to the estate, the court will
say that the prohibition has externalities. If it is costly to the estate, the
court will say it has no externalities. The right will have been asserted and
fully adjudicated. Moreover, such an inquiry, to the extent it looks at

112

Bargaining hurdles on all sides would, of course, preclude deals to defect altogether and suggest
that all bankruptcy decisions should be reviewed with an eye toward identifying externalities.
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bargaining hurdles, may incentivize parties to create those hurdles where
they do not otherwise exist.
Thus, the first best world of judicial inquiry into the precise
bargaining hurdles and externalities involved with every side agreement is
not possible. Instead, we suggest, as a second-best solution, a blanket rule
favoring ED in the plausible presence of externalities. This solution
dominates the other alternatives (all SP, all SD, or some combination)
because, as noted above, the costs introduced by SP (and SD)—namely a
reduction in information about the estate and other valuable opportunities
that may arise from asserted rights—are of a kind that the Bankruptcy Code
and the courts are not equipped to deal with. The errors introduced by ED,
on the other hand, are mitigated by the core provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code and the core expertise of the bankruptcy court. As a result, the costs
of an all-ED rule are much lower than the costs of an all-SP or all-SD rule.
SP and excessive SD can lead to inefficient outcomes in a large subset of
cases, whereas ED merely requires the court to entertain self-interested
arguments that run against the interest of the estate.
Again, assessing the merits of such arguments is one of the core
functions of a bankruptcy court. Indeed, modern bankruptcy procedure is
modeled on our civil adversary system and assumes the constant flow of
information (good and bad) to the judge. 113 Judges are well equipped to
deal with overzealous parties and we should expect courts to deny motions
and objections that destroy value. That likelihood of denial provides at least
an imperfect deterrent against such motions and objections.114 Because the
party knows that a court will deny a motion that destroys total value, it will
account for the destruction of value to others when deciding whether to
bring the motion. This effectively causes the party to internalize the value
destruction. Moreover, ED that include the cost of litigation provide further
incentives against motions and objections that parties expect the court to
deny.
We cannot reach a parallel conclusion about value-creating motions or
objections or financing arrangements that are never raised. If a party is
forced to be silent and no one asserts a position, the adversary system does
not do a good job of identifying and correcting that efficiency loss. An
113

See, e.g., Baird, supra note 106, at 35 (arguing that reorganization plans are unfair if they keep
“bankruptcy judge[s] in the dark”); Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Normative Theory of Bankruptcy Law:
Bankruptcy As (Is) Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 931, 981 (2004) (discussing the
similarities of modern bankruptcy procedure and civil procedure).
114
An increased likelihood of denial reduces the possible return a party realizes from bringing a
motion. If the party knows with certainty that a motion will be denied, the only value that can be
realized from bringing the motion is from the possibility of getting a nuisance settlement (payment by
the other party to avoid litigation costs).
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efficient DIP financing arrangement that is never proposed cannot be
created by the court, but an inefficient DIP financing arrangement that is
proposed can be rejected by the court. The same is true of plan support or
opposition. The asymmetry in how a judge deals with a bad objection (or
assertion of a right) and a bad non-objection (or non-assertion of a right)
creates the difference in kind between the costs of ED and the costs of SP
that forms the foundation for our proposed framework.
It is worth pausing here to contrast our proposal to the 2014 proposal
from the ABI reform commission. 115 As part of a global proposal for
reforming Chapter 11, the ABI commission specifically considered the
impact of agreements that prevent junior creditors from providing DIP
financing 116 and the impact of agreements that provide for the assignment
of junior creditor voting rights.117 In both instances, the commission
concluded that these specific provisions could negatively affect the value of
the estate and should, therefore, be unenforceable.
The first thing to note is that because the ABI commission proposal
considers only DIP-financing and voting-rights provisions in intercreditor
agreements, it does not cover the many other types of provisions that could
create potential inefficiencies. The proposal is, in this sense,
underinclusive.
With the two provisions the proposal does address, the commission’s
proposal is far too blunt. It would completely deny enforcement of DIPfinancing and voting-rights assignment provisions even if there were no
externalities present. Our model suggests that the provisions should be
enforced in this context. And even where externalities are present, the
model suggests that intercreditor agreements can often be enforced under
an ED regime in a manner that increases rather than decreases the value of
the estate.
C. Forum and Venue
In the discussion so far, we have focused on the questions of when and
to what extent intercreditor agreements should be enforced. In an
increasing number of recent cases, courts have faced an additional issue. If
one party seeks to pursue its rights in bankruptcy and the other argues for a
nonbankruptcy forum, which court should make the determination? Our
model provides guidance here as well.

115
116
117
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There are two relevant groups of cases: (1) cases where the plaintiff
only asks for ED; and (2) cases where the plaintiff asks for SP or SD.
1. ED-Only Contracts
There is no theoretical reason to think that a bankruptcy court has any
special knowledge in determining ED or that ED must be determined
before a plan is confirmed.
Rather, our analysis simply suggests that ED works better when a
court gets the calculation right. In the absence of evidence that bankruptcy
courts are better at measuring damages, there is no reason to favor a
bankruptcy court over any other court and we should defer to the parties’
contractual choices about forum. 118
The takeaway, then, is that for ED only cases, courts should enforce
forum selection clauses as written. If the contract does not contain a forum
selection clause, courts should turn to the default rule that the plaintiff
chooses the forum. 119 There is really no bankruptcy reason to ignore these
defaults and drag the case into the bankruptcy court.
In doctrinal language: If the promisee seeks ED, the parties’
intercreditor agreement dispute is not “core” because the key issues are
sufficiently independent of the issues in the reorganization.120 The
intercreditor agreement does not affect the total claims on the estate. It only
affects the ex post redistribution of payouts among subgroups of creditors.
The bankruptcy court can ignore the intercreditor agreement, award
payments to the group of creditors as if the intercreditor agreement did not
exist, and allow them to litigate the distribution later.121
One might argue that the intercreditor agreement claims are non-core
claims that are nonetheless related to the bankruptcy and should be brought
into the proceedings. 122 But that position has no strong logic behind it. As a
starting point, non-core claims cannot be resolved with finality by the
118

This is consistent with the general treatment of forum selection provisions in non-bankruptcy
contexts. See Atl. Marine Const. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for W. Dist. of Tex., 134 S. Ct. 568, 581 (2013)
(noting that when a forum-selection clause is valid, “a district court should ordinarily transfer the case
to the forum specified in that clause”).
119
See id. at 574 (noting the default rule that the plaintiff selects the forum and the parties’ ability
to contract out of that default rule).
120
See, e.g., In re Best Prods. Co., 168 B.R. 35, 66–68 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994) (concluding that
the court could not rule on objections to confirmation because the intercreditor dispute is not core under
28 U.S.C. § 157).
121
See Anthony J. Casey & Aziz Z. Huq, The Article III Problem in Bankruptcy, 82 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1155, 1218–23 (2014).
122
See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (2012) (“[T]he district courts shall have original but not exclusive
jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in or related to cases under title
11.”).
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bankruptcy court. 123 So the bankruptcy court’s power to coordinate is weak.
And more importantly, these ED claims are state law claims between
nondebtors with little impact on the claims against the estate. The only
issue is the amount of damages and that has nothing to do with the size of
the estate. All of these factors weigh in favor of honoring the forum
selection clause if a side agreement includes one, and permitting the
plaintiff to choose the forum if it does not.124
2. SP and SD Cases
Considerations are much different for SP and SD cases. Our model
shows that in many cases, the enforcement of SP (or SD) will impose direct
externalities on the bankruptcy estate. The promisor may fail to assert
rights whose benefits run to other creditors. Bankruptcy is a collective
process that assumes that parties rely on the arguments and actions of other
parties. Its very premise is to prevent behavior that will benefit some
stakeholders at the expense of the collective estate.
Our model therefore has suggested that courts should refrain from
enforcing SP and SD when there is a chance of externalities. Those
externalities are directly related to the reorganization because an inefficient
plan of reorganization or sale might be chosen if the promisor is silenced.
For example, as we have shown, when J is specifically prohibited from
objecting, C may be adversely affected because the value of the estate will
be reduced. 125
A bankruptcy court overseeing the reorganization process has a
unique expertise in determining whether SP (or SD) of a particular
agreement will have externalities within that reorganization. This particular
bankruptcy court should therefore decide the initial question of whether
there are potential externalities. Once the court has undertaken to make that
initial determination, it should continue with the case.
In doctrinal terms, any time that a plaintiff in one of these cases seeks
to get SP (or SD), the case becomes core because it is integrally linked to
the reorganization. This easily fits within both the statutory definition of
core under 28 U.S.C. § 157 and under the constitutional definition in the
Stern v. Marshall line of cases. 126
123
See Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 471 (2011) (discussing how bankruptcy courts may enter
final judgments in core proceedings, but in non-core proceedings, the bankruptcy courts submit
proposed findings to the district court for review and final judgment).
124
See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947) (“[T]he plaintiff’s choice of forum
should rarely be disturbed.”).
125
See supra Section II.B.2.
126
564 U.S. 462. For bankruptcy courts to have adjudicatory power over a dispute, the dispute
must be fall under the statutory definition of “core” set out in 28 U.S.C. § 157 and it must also meet the
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This approach does allow the plaintiff (S in our model) some freedom
to choose which court has power over the case. If S never asks for SP (or
SD), then the case never becomes core. This is consistent with the general
pattern in U.S. litigation of allowing the plaintiff as master of the complaint
to craft a case consistent with its desired forum. 127
IV. APPLYING OUR THEORY TO CASES
In Part II, we described how bankruptcy courts have handled
intercreditor agreement issues in the most important recent cases. Having
developed our model and its implications, we now revisit the cases and
explain how they would be resolved under our approach. In addition to the
cases discussed earlier, this Part analyzes the In re Extended Stay, Inc.
(Extended Stay) bankruptcy, which raises particularly subtle intercreditor
agreement issues.
A. Boston Generating
The Boston Generating 128 bankruptcy involved an intercreditor
agreement that set the priority of the parties to the agreement. It also
included provisions preventing the second-lien creditors from bringing any
objections or asserting certain rights. During the case these provisions
raised the question of whether the second-lien creditors had standing to
object to a sale. Despite terms providing that the second-lien creditors had
no rights other than holding the lien, voting on a plan, and asserting the
interests of unsecured creditors, the court allowed them standing to object
to bid procedures. 129
To get there, the court introduced and applied the “beyond
peradventure” standard. 130 The court appeared to say that provisions of an
intercreditor agreement that limit the ability of a party to assert bankruptcy
rights should be held to a higher standard of interpretation and enforced

constitutional definition of “core” laid out in Stern. Thus the court in Stern held that a bankruptcy court
could not adjudicate a tort counter claim because it was statutorily core but not constitutionally core. Id.
at 502–03.
127
Atl. Marine Const. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for W. Dist. of Texas, 134 S. Ct. 568, 581 (2013)
(“Because plaintiffs are ordinarily allowed to select whatever forum they consider most advantageous
(consistent with jurisdictional and venue limitations), we have termed their selection the ‘plaintiff’s
venue privilege.’” (quoting Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 635 (1964)).
128
Interim Order (I) Authorizing Debtors to Utilize Cash Collateral Pursuant To 11 U.S.C. § 363;
(II) Granting Adequate Protection to Prepetition Secured Parties Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 361, 362 and
363; and (III) Scheduling a Final Hearing Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 4001(B), In re Boston
Generating, LLC, 440 B.R. 302 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 10-14419).
129
See Boston Generating, 440 B.R. at 319.
130
Id.
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only if they lack any ambiguity. This is a strange mode of contract
interpretation and suggests the courts may be playing fast and loose with
the canons of contract law to get to a pragmatically desirable outcome. 131 It
also suggests that courts that adhere to the same approach will find
themselves in a tough spot when the parties have drafted an ironclad
agreement that nonetheless destroys value.
To be sure, the primary outcome in Boston Generating—denying
specific enforcement of the agreement—is exactly what our proposal calls
for, provided that the objection could impose externalities on nonparties to
the agreement.132 The posture of the case was such that the externalities
were potentially high, and the court would not have known the exact level
until after it considered the objection. The sale, if it was not optimal, could
have drained value from the remaining unsecured creditors (an externality).
And until the court heard the objection from the second-lien creditors, it
would not have known whether the sale was optimal or not. And if there
had not been an organized and powerful creditor group to bring the
objection, then the issue would have gone unreviewed. The potential
externality from leaving important issues unreviewed is the precise
problem that requires the denial of SP.
The path by which the court got to that outcome, however, is
problematic. The “beyond peradventure” standard makes it less likely that a
promisor would be required to pay damages when a side agreement is
breached. To be sure, the damages in Boston Generating would have been
small. The objection that the second-lien creditors brought was ultimately
denied, and the sale went through. 133 The damages running to the first-lien
creditors should, therefore, have been no more than the costs of responding
to the objection. But if the objection had succeeded and value for the firsts
had been lost, the damages might have been more significant.
Generally, the “beyond peradventure” standard invites promisors to
opportunistically breach intercreditor agreements that involve some
ambiguity. Imagine that the second-lien creditors’ objection could have

131

This is consistent with a common observation that bankruptcy courts often take some doctrinal
license when working toward the right pragmatic outcome. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Anthony J.
Casey, No Exit? Withdrawal Rights and the Law of Corporate Reorganizations, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
24 (2013) (explaining that “judges are tempted to overlook the niceties of corporate form”).
132
A court might reasonably decide that the other creditors are so far out of the money that the
outcome of the hearing would only affect the payoffs of the first- and second-lien creditors. SP would
be justifiable under those circumstances.
133
Boston Generating, 440 B.R. at 320–21 (acknowledging that “this is a somewhat hollow victory
for the Second Lien Lenders, inasmuch as I have determined, after giving full consideration to the
arguments and evidence presented by the Second Lien Agent and the objecting Second Lien Lenders, to
approve the Sale Transaction”).
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disrupted things just enough to stop the sale, and the first-lien creditors
would have borne a large loss as a result. If the second-lien creditors do not
bear any costs for that disruption, then they may bring the objection even
when it destroys estate value. The only way to correct this is through ED,
which causes them to bear the costs of the failed sale (and to balance them
against the benefits of bringing the objection). But those damages are not
awarded under the “beyond peradventure” standard that the court used.
Another potential unintended consequence of the “beyond
peradventure” approach is that parties will skew the substance of future
agreements so as to delineate the promisee’s rights more broadly. This may
lead to promisors waiving more bankruptcy rights and create greater
negative externalities. One common ambiguity in intercreditor agreements
comes from promisors waiving only the rights that accrue to secured
creditors while preserving their rights to object as unsecured creditors. 134 If
second-lien creditors waive these additional rights, the waiver may become
“clear beyond peradventure,” but it will also become much broader and
actions that have the potential to benefit unsecured creditors will become
less likely.
Boston Generating highlights the risks of both SP on one hand and a
“beyond peradventure” standard (in which damages are not available) on
the other hand. Our proposal suggests that it is better to alter the contractual
remedies for breach (from SP or SD to ED) rather than the interpretive
standard for determining breach. Enforcing broad contracts but not narrow
contracts is over and underinclusive in perverse ways. Broad contracts that
prohibit all defection will be specifically enforced without regard to the
harm to the estate while narrow provisions that are targeted at specific
holdout behavior will be unenforceable even for damages. An alternative
approach—faithfully interpreting the language of the contract but only
allowing for ED—ensures that the parties to the side agreement can tailor
the agreement to prevent holdout behavior when it is most likely to occur
without prohibiting other potentially beneficial defection behavior. If courts
focus on the remedy, they can limit negative externalities of side
agreements without interfering with this tailoring ability.
B. Momentive
Momentive was ultimately a damages case. Though the intercreditor
agreement specifically gave the senior lien creditors the option to ask for a
134

A junior secured lender will usually be both a secured creditor and an unsecured creditor
because the value of its collateral will be less than the full amount of its claim, leaving the junior
creditor with a secured claim up to the value of the collateral and an unsecured claim for the deficiency.
See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2012) (bifurcating claims of undersecured creditors).
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SP remedy, senior lien creditors did not press arguments to enjoin the
junior lien creditors from asserting their rights. Such a move would have
been problematic, due to the dynamics of the Chapter 11 reorganization
process. The Bankruptcy Code authorizes the debtor to propose a resolution
of the bankruptcy. 135 In that process, the debtor can choose the particulars
of the plan. In practice, this is achieved through complicated negotiations
with various stakeholders, which result in a plan that favors some and
disfavors others. The Bankruptcy Code then provides baseline protections
such as absolute priority and the best interests test to ensure that alliances
do not overly favor or disfavor certain groups of creditors. 136 There is still,
however, a wide range of discretion in which the debtor may operate. Lots
of deals to defect and other agreements are negotiated to ensure the debtor
has the necessary support for a plan. Within the limits of the absolute
priority rule and the best interests test, value moves from one group of
stakeholders to another in an attempt to lock in a feasible plan that creates
value for the estate as a whole. In Momentive, these deals took the form, as
they increasingly do in large bankruptcies, of a restructuring support
agreement (RSA). 137 The RSA locked in the defection and provided the
details of the plan that would result. 138
If the senior lien holders in Momentive had forced the junior lien
holders to vote against a plan, the court might have lost information about
the value of the estate and the claims. 139 As noted above, only when parties
assert their interests by voting and arguing in favor of a plan does the court
receive information about: (1) whether the proposed plan complies with
Bankruptcy Code requirements, such as the absolute priority rule and the
best interests test; (2) whether the plan provides value to the estate; and (3)
whether the deals to defect are problematic. Imagine a reorganization with
three classes of creditors where side agreements silence the class in the
middle. Now imagine there are two possible plans that could be confirmed.
The best plan maximizes value and benefits the junior two classes. The
other plan shifts value from the middle class to the senior creditors and
135

See 11 U.S.C. § 1121(c) (2012) (giving the debtor an exclusive right to propose a plan initially);
id. § 1121(d) (authorizing court to extend the debtor’s exclusivity period).
136
The absolute priority rule prohibits confirmation of a reorganization plan that would give any
recovery to a lower priority class unless the objecting class is paid in full. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)
(2012). The best interests test requires that each creditor or equity holder be given at least as much as it
would receive in a Chapter 7 liquidation. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (2012).
137
Baird, supra note 106, at 19.
138
See Declaration of William H. Carter, Chief Financial Officer of Momentive Performance
Materials Inc., In Support of Chapter 11 Petitions and First Day Pleadings at 66, In re MPM Silicones,
LLC, 518 B.R. 740 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014) (No. 14-22503).
139
This might include information about the risk of the business, the value of its assets, or the cost
and availability of alternative capital sources.
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leaves the third class completely out of the money. Without hearing from
the middle class, the court is faced simply with a two-party disagreement
about the value of the two plans. Now imagine, quite realistically, that the
third class is a fractured and dispersed group of unsecured creditors. If we
let the middle class vote and assert their interest, we are likely to get a plan
that maximizes the estate and benefits the two junior classes.140 Much
information can thus be gained by allowing the middle class to assert its
interest and express its independent view of the options.
As noted above, the junior lien holders in Momentive were allowed to
assert their interests. In that sense, the outcome of the case is consistent
with our model. The standard was a rough doctrinal tool to get a pragmatic
outcome. Yet, the court—applying the “beyond peradventure” standard—
found no breach of the agreement and therefore awarded no damages for
the senior lien creditors. Applying the “beyond peradventure” standard to
damages cases in that way is not consistent with our model. This
application introduces unnecessary costs on independent contracting, and
thus makes it harder to design an agreement that is targeted at preventing
holdout behavior.
Once SP was off the table and the junior lien creditors were allowed to
assert their interests, there was no longer a bankruptcy purpose to justify
not awarding damages on the contract. Instead, the court simply failed to
enforce an intercreditor agreement and reduced the ability of the
nondebtors to privately order their respective payments from the
bankruptcy estate. Our model suggests instead that Momentive should have
been an ED case—and one that never belonged in the bankruptcy court in
the first place.141
C. RadioShack
As noted earlier, the disputes in RadioShack were quite
complicated.142 Standard General wanted to credit bid the amounts owed to
it under the ABL. 143 Salus was trying to assert the rights of the SCP lender
group under an intercreditor agreement to stop Standard General from

140

See generally David Arthur Skeel, Jr., The Nature and Effect of Corporate Voting in Chapter 11
Reorganization Cases, 78 VA. L. REV. 461 (1992) (arguing that the Bankruptcy Code is designed to
focus voting authority on the affected class or classes).
141
We discuss the appropriate damages calculation in Part V, infra.
142
See supra Section I.C.
143
See Transcript of Hearing, supra note 16, at 38,; Borders et al., supra note 16, at 2. On the
definition of credit bidding, see, e.g., In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 320 (3d Cir.
2010) (defining credits bid as “allow[ing] a secured lender to bid the debt owed it in lieu of other
currency at a sale of its collateral”).
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doing that. 144 Cerberus was trying to assert its rights under an AAL to
prohibit Salus from asserting its rights to block the credit bid. 145 Finally, the
first-out lenders of the ABL were trying to assert their rights under an AAL
to stop Standard General from moving forward with the sale and credit
bid. 146
In the end, the court formally held that Cerberus could stop Salus from
asserting its rights. 147 At the same time, the first-out lenders were pressured
by the court to settle and give up their objections to the sale.148 As a result,
the sale went forward. 149
From a realist perspective of the whole case, the court was fully aware
of (and likely considered) all the various parties’ reasoning and arguments
and let the sale go forward. The realist might view the court’s actions as
refusing to allow anyone to assert rights that would prohibit the sale. The
court, then, heard all the arguments, decided the sale was the appropriate
outcome, and ruled on the various agreements in a way that allowed the
sale to go through. In that sense, the denial of Salus’s ability to object did
not deprive the court of the necessary information to rule on the sale.
From a more formalistic viewpoint, it declined to specifically enforce
the first-out lenders’ asserted right to prohibit Standard General from
bidding. It then specifically enforced Cerberus’s right to stop Salus from
specifically enforcing its right to prohibit the bidding.
Our model suggests that the court got to the right outcome but that the
formalistic path was not quite right. Salus’s attempt to stop the sale under
the intercreditor agreement was fraught with the risk of imposing
externalities on the estate (the unsecured creditors in particular). The court
should have denied Salus the right to invoke the intercreditor agreement
outright, rather than denying it indirectly by granting Cerberus’s SP
request. Finally, damages suits should have been the remedy allowed for
each of the various parties.
D. Extended Stay
The Extended Stay bankruptcy involved two separate disputes that
implicate our model.150
144

See Transcript of Hearing, supra note 16, at 23, 29–30, 34, 63.
Id. at 63.
146
Id. at 67.
147
See Transcript of Hearing, supra note 75, at 64–65.
148
See id. at 65–67.
149
See id. at 60–67.
150
See In re Extended Stay Inc., 418 B.R. 49 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d in part, 435 B.R. 139
(S.D.N.Y. 2010).
145
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The Extended Stay hotel chain had been acquired by an investor
consortium led by David Lichtenstein in 2007.151 The funds were raised
through a mortgage loan and ten layers of mezzanine loans.152 The
mortgage loan was sold to a trust and certificates in the trust were then sold
off into eighteen different priority classes.153 Some of the mezzanine loans
were also securitized and interests in them were resold. 154 The result was a
constellation of dozens of creditor classes who were vying for power when
the chain filed for bankruptcy in 2009.155
The first dispute that concerns us was among the holders of the trust
certificates for the mortgage loan. The trust agreements provided for a
Servicer and Special Servicer who would be the sole representatives of the
certificate holders. 156 The certificate holders agreed that they would have no
individual rights to institute any action or proceeding in bankruptcy. 157
They also agreed that no certificate holder could take any action that would
prejudice the rights of any other certificate holder.158
Based on these agreements, Five Mile Capital, one of the certificate
holders, brought an action against other junior certificate holders to enjoin
them from engaging in any negotiations and agreements with a debtor. 159
Consistent with our venue analysis, which characterizes an attempt to
specifically enforce a side agreement as core, the bankruptcy court held
that an attempt to enjoin negotiations with a debtor was plainly core and
affected the bankruptcy proceedings. 160
This dispute falls at the heart of our model. Five Mile Capital’s
attempt to prevent any negotiation of deals to defect was likely to create
externalities that could reduce the overall value of the estate. The
appropriate remedy for the breach of the trust agreements under our
analysis is to deny the injunction and allow an action for damages.
The second dispute related to a “bad boy” guarantee agreement. Bad
boy guarantees are terms by which a borrower and its guarantors agree to
151

Id. at 54.
Id.
153
Id.
154
Id.
155
Id.
156
Id. at 56.
157
Id.
158
Id.
159
Id. at 57.
160
Id. This ruling was affirmed on appeal by the district court. Extended Stay, 435 B.R. at 146
(“Five Mile’s efforts to prevent the Debtors from pursuing ongoing post-filing negotiations in their
reorganization proceeding clearly implicate the core bankruptcy function of estate administration,
particularly plan formulation.”).
152
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be liable to lenders for certain “bad acts.” 161 The bad acts often include the
filing of bankruptcy. The effect is a provision that converts a non-recourse
mortgage into a loan with recourse against the debtor and its principals
when a debtor files for bankruptcy. In Extended Stay, Lichtenstein and his
equity fund had personally guaranteed the mezzanine debt up to $100
million in the event that the debtor filed a bankruptcy petition.162 The
bankruptcy court held that these claims were neither core nor related to the
bankruptcy and found that it did not have jurisdiction over them. 163 Our
model suggests this was the wrong decision.
These guarantees may not appear on their face to be intercreditor
agreements of the type we have been considering. Instead, they are
agreements between the debtor and its principals on one side and a creditor
on the other. But the liability of the principals can have the exact same
effect as the intercreditor agreements in our model. If a principal is required
by the guarantee to take or not take certain actions, this can change the
decisionmaking process in bankruptcy. Just as a creditor may be forced to
refrain from negotiations or from voting on a plan, a controlling
shareholder may be forced to refrain from filing a bankruptcy and
proposing a plan. This can prevent deals to defect between other creditors
and the controlling shareholder.
For example, a net positive value bankruptcy filing may benefit the
estate as a whole but be prohibited under a bad boy guarantee. If the
creditor chooses to enforce that guarantee specifically or by SD, the estate
will be worse off. And, it turns out, these agreements in operation often
have the flavor of excessive SD.
This was true in Extended Stay. Bank of America argued that its claim
had nothing to do with the bankruptcy estate because the money came out
of the equity holders’ pockets, not the estate. The agreements even
prohibited any indemnification claims from guarantors against the estate.164
But, if enforced, the agreements—which required payment of up to $100
million—functioned as a SD provision that would discourage the filing of a
bankruptcy even when that filing was value-enhancing for the estate.
To see why, compare the payouts to Bank of America outside
bankruptcy to those in bankruptcy. Outside bankruptcy, Bank of America
had a non-recourse claim on the collateral. Inside bankruptcy, Bank of
161

See Djaha et al., supra note 21.
See Extended Stay, 418 B.R. at 54.
163
Id. at 57–59. On appeal, the district court agreed that the matters were not core but found that
they were related to the bankruptcy. Extended Stay, 435 B.R. at 150. It nonetheless affirmed the holding
because it found that abstention of jurisdiction was appropriate in that case. Id.
164
Extended Stay, 418 B.R. at 58.
162
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America had that same claim. Thus, the expected damages for the bad
act—filing for bankruptcy—would be the difference in the value of that
recourse claim in bankruptcy and the value of the same claim out of
bankruptcy. 165 But the guarantee provides damages equal to the total
deficiency claim (the difference between the total debt and the value of the
recourse claim). The guarantee value, then, can greatly exceed the ED.166
This transforms the guarantee into a SD clause that imposes the exact
externalities we discuss in our model. These claims are therefore core to the
bankruptcy proceeding, 167 and if the externalities do exist, only ED should
be allowed and awarded.
V. CALCULATING EXPECTATION DAMAGES
Now that we have discussed the leading cases, we can address with
examples a concern that our proposal might raise—namely that a court
might not calculate ED properly. If the parties do not have faith in the
courts to calculate the damages for breaches of intercreditor agreements,
the superiority of ED over the side agreement parties’ choice of remedies is
not guaranteed. 168 Damage awards that are too high have the same effects
as SD. Damage awards that are too low may have no useful impact and
encourage too many breaches. In those cases, ED will be flawed.
This problem is not unique to intercreditor agreements. Rather, the
inability to calculate accurate damages is common to all areas of contract
law. 169 But there are at least three reasons to think that the scope of the
problem will be limited in relation to intercreditor agreements.
165

The difference might arise from the Bankruptcy Code’s suspension of rights that the creditor
might exercise or be based on economic effects from the filing. Unsecured creditors are not entitled to
interest or opportunity cost payments during the bankruptcy case.
166
For example, a creditor may have a lien of 100 on an asset worth 50. Assume the debtor has no
other assets. Outside bankruptcy, that claim is worth 50 (assuming no cost of foreclosure). Inside
bankruptcy, that claim might be worth 45 (assuming 5 in process costs of bankruptcy). The ED are 5. A
bad boy guarantee provides recourse against the principal for any shortfall below 100. Assuming the
guarantor is solvent, the bankruptcy filing provides recovery of 100.
167
If damages were set high enough, the bad boy guarantee could become the equivalent of an
absolute agreement that prevents a party from filing bankruptcy altogether. Such an agreement goes to
the very heart of bankruptcy and is generally not enforceable. See, e.g., In re Intervention Energy
Holdings, LLC, 553 B.R. 258, 263 (Bankr. D. Del. 2016) (“It is a well settled principle that an advance
agreement to waive the benefits conferred by the bankruptcy laws is wholly void as against public
policy.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Again our framework suggests that such a
policy is wise as it applies to SP and SD but not as it applies to ED.
168
See Example 3 in the Appendix, which shows that ED can be inferior to the parties’ choice of
SP when externalities are low.
169
See, e.g., Metallurgical Indus., Inc. v. Fourtek, Inc., 790 F.2d 1195, 1208 (5th Cir. 1986) (“If too
few facts exist to permit the trier of fact to calculate proper damages, then a reasonable remedy in law is
unavailable.”).
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First, courts calculate complicated damages claims all the time.
Indeed, every large bankruptcy is really one large series of claim and asset
valuations. Courts will not be perfect at valuing the damages for these
claims, but they should be relatively good at it. Nevertheless, damages
could be too speculative to calculate.
This is a practical and a doctrinal problem. Courts generally will not
award damages when the claims are unduly speculative. This rule varies by
jurisdiction, but the general rule is that the parties have to be able to show
the presence of damages with some certainty. 170 Notably, this doctrine does
not require absolute certainty and allows for sophisticated financial
evidence to provide a reasonable estimate of the losses caused by a
breach. 171
That said, courts are more skeptical of some types of claims than
others. For instance, lost-profits claims tend to garner the closest scrutiny
under the uncertainty doctrine.172 That suggests that our proposal will face
the largest obstacle when damages claims are brought based on the
speculative future business performance under counterfactual plans of
reorganization that might have been confirmed but for the breach of the
side agreement. But damages based on the value of actual differences in
asset distributions, in concrete financing proposals, in interest rates, in costs
of procedures, and in the price paid for assets should fit easily within the
courts’ traditional valuation toolkit. If the party seeking damages can show
the likelihood that the breach foreclosed a concrete alternative, the court
will be able to arrive at a reasonable estimate of the damages associated
with that breach.
Most damages claims for breach of a side agreement will meet this
standard. For example, the primary claims in Momentive were that the
junior creditor breached the side agreement by (1) supporting a plan with a
low cramdown interest rate for the senior creditor; (2) supporting a plan
that did not provide make-whole payments to the senior creditors; (3)
opposing the senior creditors’ request for adequate protection payments; (4)
receiving distributions that violated the priority set forth in the agreement;
and (5) supporting DIP financing that provided the new lender with
priming liens on the senior creditors’ collateral.

170

See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 352 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
See Ashland Mgmt. Inc. v. Janien, 624 N.E.2d 1007, 1010–11 (N.Y. 1993); Tanner v. Exxon
Corp., No. 79C–JA–5, 1981 WL 191389, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. July 23, 1981); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 352; 24 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD., A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF CONTRACTS § 64:8 (4th ed. 2002).
172
See Example 3 in the Appendix.
171
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The damages on the first and second claims would be easy to
calculate. The interest rate differential and the make-whole differential are
set, so finding those numbers requires simple subtraction. The only open
question is whether or not the plan would have been approved but for the
support of the breaching party. That is a mechanical application of
Bankruptcy Code’s voting requirements for cramdown.
Damages for the third claim turn on the amount of the adequate
protection payments and the likelihood that they would have been granted
in the absence of the opposition by the breaching creditors. The only
speculation required to calculate those damages is speculation on the
outcomes of judicial process, a topic on which judges have sufficient
expertise. The damages on the fourth claim are straightforward, as courts
regularly resolve priority and subordination questions. The fifth claim
poses perhaps the most uncertainty. To prove damages, the senior creditors
would have to show a concrete alternative financing proposal that would
have been adopted if the breaching creditors had not supported the one they
did. Once that showing is made, calculating damages is just a matter of
comparing the protections the senior creditors would receive under two
proposals.
The RadioShack and Boston Generating cases dealt with objections to
bankruptcy sales. In Boston Generating, the damages would have been
merely the litigation costs. The breaching party brought its objection to the
sale, the objection was denied, and the sale went through. Had the sale been
blocked, the court would have had to compare the actual outcome with the
terms of the proposed sale. That is not a speculative calculation. In
RadioShack, the parties on both sides of the sale objections invoked side
agreements. Salus and the first-out lenders wanted to invoke side
agreements to block the sale, and Cerberus wanted to invoke a side
agreement to push the sale through (to block objections to the sale).
Cerberus’s damages claims would be no different than the damages claims
in Boston Generating. If the sale was blocked, the court would just need to
compare the sale that was blocked with the actual outcome.
Salus’s damage claim, on the other hand, might have been deemed
unduly speculative. There was little evidence that any alternative buyers
were actually available to buy the assets. Nothing was known about
competing prices or terms. Any claim based on a breach that leads to a sale
is speculative if the alternative to a sale was simply waiting and hoping for
a better deal to come along. That suggests that without concrete evidence of
an alternative, the damages for a breach that leads to a sale will be zero (or
at least no more than the cost of litigating the issue).
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Five Mile Capital’s claims in Extended Stay would be, perhaps, the
most speculative. The allegation was that the breaching party was
negotiating with the debtor “over the contours of a potential plan of
reorganization” in violation of the side agreement.173 Measuring the
damages in that situation requires a prediction of what the “contours” of a
confirmable plan would have looked like in the absence of the negotiation.
Without deeper information about the specific provisions at issue, 174 that is
a difficult counterfactual to prove. Thus, we recognize that in a small
population of cases ED might undercompensate because they are
speculative. But the realm of cases where damages are truly speculative is
small enough to give us confidence that ED are preferable as a general
rule. 175
Second, the relevant comparison in measuring how well damages are
calculated is between the courts’ accuracy in setting damages ex post and
the accuracy of the parties in estimating damages ex ante. For expectation
damages to function as we describe in our model, they only need to be as
good as or better than the ex ante estimates that parties use when writing
these agreements. There is good reason to think the courts will be more
accurate: A court adjudicating these claims after the fact has more
information about the damages claim than the parties have when setting SD
or providing for SP long before distress arises. The court also has the
benefit of expert testimony and could even bring in unbiased courtappointed experts.
The ex post nature of the damages inquiry also gives the court the time
for reflection and gathering of evidence. In deciding a SP question that
determines whether a court will allow objections to a sale or a confirmation
hearing, the court is under considerable time pressure. Parties often argue
that a quick sale is imperative to avoid the classic “melting ice cube”
problem of bankruptcy. In those contexts, decisions on SP, and general
173

In re Extended Stay Inc., 435 B.R. 139, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
Because the case was injunctive in nature, Five Mile Capital was attempting to prevent all
potential negotiations and thus framed its legal argument broadly. Had the case been in a damages
stage, Five Mile Capital likely would have pointed to concrete provisions that harmed it, and that
evidence might have demonstrated damages more specifically.
175
Many of the damages calculations we have discussed deal with bankruptcy-specific processes.
That might lead some to disagree with our earlier conclusions on forum and venue and call for these
disputes to be litigated exclusively before a bankruptcy court. But none of these processes are
conceptually inaccessible to a generalist judge who is experienced in hearing evidence on and
measuring damages in all sorts of fields. And the ability of bankruptcy experts to testify as to the costs
of these processes makes the damages calculation here no different than the calculations in the medical
malpractice, environmental, or financial cases that courts routinely adjudicate. Additionally, the parties
always have the ability to include forum selection or arbitration clauses that require the cases to be
heard by someone with expertise.
174
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decisions about whether certain debtor actions are acceptable, have to be
made with limited information. An intercreditor damages claim, on the
other hand, need not be decided on such a short time frame. If a junior
creditor wants to support an emergency bankruptcy sale in violation of an
intercreditor agreement, the court can allow the sale to go through under
standard bankruptcy principles and then adjudicate later whether the junior
creditor’s support harmed the senior creditor. Evidence that comes to light
after the sale (such as proof that another firm bidder would have come to
light if the sale had been delayed) cannot be used to undo the sale, but it
can be used to support a damages claim under the intercreditor agreement.
Third, the problem only exists if the expected value of a claim is
skewed in one direction. If courts are imprecise in an unbiased manner, the
model still holds. 176 When considering whether to breach a side agreement
and valuing the potential damages for that breach, the parties will compare
the benefit of breaching against the expected value of the damages claim. If
errors are unbiased, that expected value does not change. Of course, if there
are some claims where the courts are known to systematically err in one
direction, the framework could be modified to allow for SP where we
expect courts to get things systematically wrong. The judicially mandated
interest rates used in cramdown 177—which do not match actual market
rates—might be an example of this sort of systematic bias.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, we analyzed intercreditor and other side agreements,
and what bankruptcy law should do about them. The courts’ current
approaches to the topic vary. They recognize potential problems with fully
enforcing these agreements, but their response to that recognition tends to
be a decision to read the contract language narrowly so as to preserve the
rights the Bankruptcy Code provides. This approach, as we show, may
cause parties to simply draft these side agreements using broader language,
thus exacerbating the underlying problem. We argue that a more systematic
approach that addresses remedies is warranted.
We model the costs and benefits of enforcing side agreements and
show that side agreements can create externalities that bankruptcy law is
justified in limiting. We propose that side agreements should be
176

See Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J.L.
ECON. & ORG., 279, 293 (1986); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and
Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 406 (1973); Kenton K. Yee, Control Premiums,
Minority Discounts, and Optimal Judicial Valuation, 48 J.L. & ECON. 517, 536–37 (2005) (noting the
irrelevance of unbiased errors for risk neutral litigants).
177
See Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 479 (2004).
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enforceable but only for damages and not specific performance. The
equitable remedy of specific performance for a breach of a side agreement
should be replaced with expectation damages if there is a potential for
value-destroying externalities. Though our proposal is not a panacea for all
problems that might arise in bankruptcy, on balance, it honors the purpose
of the side agreement while preserving open space for value-increasing
actions that can benefit outside stakeholders.
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APPENDIX
In this Appendix, we give two additional examples to show that
parties may choose SP inefficiently and that ED can improve upon SP. But
ED is not a panacea, and when externalities are low, enforcing the parties’
agreed-upon bargain is socially preferred.
Example 3: Undercompensatory ED
Good State (p=.5)
R

Bad State (1-p=.5)

L

R

L

S

130

200

100

250

J

20

0

20

0

C

70

0

120

0

S+J

150

200

120

250

S+J+C

220

200

240

250

In Example 3, we consider the possibility that courts will
underestimate expectation damages, which leads the parties to choose SP
instead. But ED would be efficient notwithstanding its undercompensation
of the promisee. The undercompensation allows C to capture more of the
gains from defection, which S+J do not internalize when they strike their
side deal.
a. Status quo
As in Examples 1 and 2, J would choose action R to improve her
payoff by 20. This is efficient in the good state (it produces a total payoff
of 220 versus 200) but inefficient in the bad state (a total payoff of 240
instead of 250).
b. Side agreement with SP
If the parties choose SP, J will agree to choose action L, which
generates a higher payoff for the S+J coalition in both states (200 versus
150 in the good state and 250 versus 120 in the bad state). The S+J
coalition will get an expected payoff of 225 under SP.
c. Side agreement with SD
In Example 3, action R is costly for S, but it is particularly costly for S
in the bad state. If the parties choose a SD contract, they have two choices:
they can try to set damages high enough to prevent action R in the bad
state, or they can set damages lower in order to elicit action R and a side
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payment from C in the good state. They cannot do both. If they set
damages above 90, then J+C would find it too expensive to defect in the
good state. But if they set damages below 140, J+C would defect and
choose action R in the bad state.
In Example 3, the optimal SD contract for the S+J coalition is d = 140
or higher, which elicits action L in both states. Thus, the optimal SD
contract is equivalent to a SP contract. If they were to choose d = 90
instead, action R would be chosen in both states. In the good state, this
elicits a side payment of 70 from C to J, and in the bad state, C pays 95 to
J. 178 The S+J coalition anticipates these side payments, and thus they expect
a total payout of 220 in the good state and 215 in the bad state for an
expected payoff of only 217.5 < 225.
d. Undercompensatory ED
Now, let’s assume that courts will attempt to estimate ED upon a
breach, but they will underestimate the damages by 50%, and all parties are
aware of the undercompensation. In the good state, S loses 70, so the true
damages will be estimated at 35. In the bad state, the true damages of 150
will be estimated at only 75. Given the undercompensatory damages, J will
choose to defect in both states and choose action R. When C and J bargain,
C will make a side payment of 42.5 in the good state and 87.5 in the bad
state to induce action R.179 Thus, the S+J coalition expects 192.5 in the
good state (direct payoff of 150 plus the 42.5 side payment) and 207.5 in
the bad state (120 plus 87.5). This produces an expected payoff of 200,
which is less than their expected payoff from the SP contract (225). Though
SP is preferred by the S+J coalition, undercompensatory ED produces a
higher total payoff for all parties. Undercompensatory ED results in action
R in both states, and the total expected payoff to all parties is 230. The SP
contract results in action L in both states, which produces a total expected
payoff of only 225.
Two points about undercompensatory ED are worth emphasizing.
First, undercompensatory ED beats the S+J coalition’s SP contract from a
social perspective because externalities are sufficiently high. To see this,
suppose C’s payoff from action R falls by 40 in both states (to 30 in the
good state and 80 in the bad state). Because damages are low, C and J
would bargain to breach and choose action R in both states, but the social
178

A side payment of 95 splits the surplus from defection between J and C in the bad state.
Collectively, J and C gain 50 from defecting (their direct payoff increases by 140, less 90 in damages).
C gets half of that surplus in bargaining, so it will pay 95 to J and keep 120 – 95 = 25.
179
In the good state, C and J would get a surplus equal to the improvement in their payoff from
choosing action R less the damages they pay to S. This is 90 – 35 = 55. C gets half of that surplus, or
27.5, so C pays a side payment of 70 – 27.5 = 42.5 to J. The bad state calculation follows similarly.
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payoff would be inferior to choosing action L in both states. Significant
externalities are necessary to justify replacing SP with ED.
Second, undercompensatory ED is not as efficient as fully
compensatory ED would be. If ED were estimated properly, J would
breach and choose action R in the good state and L in the bad state. This
would be the most efficient option, and if it were available, S and J would
choose it. But because it is not available, they choose a SP contract that is
inferior socially to the undercompensatory ED that is available.
e. Takeaways from Example 3
Example 3 illustrates that parties may rationally avoid ED because
they do not expect courts to fully estimate the damages from breach. When
damages are undercompensatory, breach occurs more often than is socially
efficient. Undercompensatory ED also results in a greater surplus being
retained by parties outside the side agreement. This causes the side
contracting parties S+J to steer away from ED and choose an alternative
(SP) that allows the coalition to keep more of the surplus that is available,
even though this choice may be socially inferior. When externalities are
higher, the incentives of parties become more skewed toward SP and away
from undercompensatory ED.
Example 4: Bargaining with S to enforce the side agreement
Good State (p=.5)
R
C1

Bad State (1−p=.5)

L

R

L

0

50

0

50

S

210

200

120

200

J

20

0

20

0

C2

50

0

50

0

S+J

230

200

140

200

C1 +S+J+C2

280

250

190

250

In Example 4, we consider the possibility that the bargaining
environment may change. In this case we suppose that S is able to strike a
deal to defect but J is not. What effects will this have on the incentives of
the S+J coalition with respect to the side agreement they write, and how
will this impact the efficiency of ED as an alternative?
To make the case interesting, we introduce two outside parties (C1
and C2). C1’s interests are more aligned with S than with J, while C2’s
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interests are more aligned with J. We suppose that C1 has the ability to
bargain with S, but C2 and J cannot bargain.
f. Status quo
The status quo outcome is similar to Examples 1 and 2. J will choose
action R to improve her payoff by 20. This will be consistent with
efficiency in the good state (a total payoff of 280 versus 250) but inefficient
in the bad state (190 versus 250).
g. Specific performance and stipulated damages
Notice that in this example, S’s and J’s direct payoffs are aligned in
the good state: they both prefer action R. This makes the analysis of SP
contracts different from the earlier examples. If S+J can write a side deal
that includes SP as a remedy, S will require that J choose action L. This
will result in J choosing action L in the bad state. In the good state,
however, S also prefers action R. Thus, S can choose not to enforce the side
agreement, allowing J to choose action R. Knowing this, C1 will offer a
side deal to S to induce S to enforce the contract against J.180
Because C1 strongly prefers action L, C1 will be willing to pay S to
invoke its right against J. Because C1 and S will split their total surplus of
250 – 210 = 40 in half, C1 will pay 30 to S to induce S to invoke J’s choice
of action L.181 This is inefficient in the good state because C2’s payoff is
not taken into account.
If S and J chose to write a contract with SD, the outcome would be
equivalent to the SP outcome. S and J would set damages high enough that
J will prefer not to breach the contract if S chooses to enforce it. J will
choose action R in both states, and in the good state, C1 will make the same
side payment to induce S to enforce the contract against J.
h. Expectation damages
Under ED, the outcome differs from the outcome that would occur
under the S+J coalition’s preferred contract. In Example 4, ED again results
in a more efficient outcome. In the bad state, J will perform under the
contract and choose action L. In the good state, J will breach and choose
action R. J will not need to pay any damages for breach because S’s direct
payoff also favors action R. This outcome is consistent with efficiency.

180
Note that this does not require a bargain with J, which we have assumed is not possible here. S
could simply communicate to J whether it intended to enforce its contract against J or not, and J will act
accordingly.
181
The payment of 30 consists of 10 to compensate S for its lower payout under L (200, vs. 210
under R), plus one half of the parties’ joint surplus of 40.
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It is crucial to emphasize, however, that the efficiency consequences
can be reversed, depending on C2’s payoff. To see this most simply,
consider Example 4 if C2’s payoff in both states falls from 50 to below 20
under action R. None of the contracts or outcomes would change, but the
efficiency consequences would be reversed and the SP contract the parties
prefer would yield an efficient outcome, while ED would not.
i. Takeaways from Example 4
Example 4 highlights another potential source of inefficiency that can
result from side contracting, but it also illustrates that replacing the parties’
choice of remedies with ED is not a panacea for all efficiency problems.
The inefficiency of the side agreement follows because the parties to the
side agreement will take into account only themselves and the parties with
whom they expect to be able to strike bargains. In the earlier examples, we
showed the virtues of ED, which flow from the ability of J to strike deals to
defect. But when J cannot bargain, a SP contract (or a SD contract with
damages high enough to prevent breach) can be preferred.
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